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GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: 
THE CASE FOR REGULATING STATE-OWNED 
FINANCIAL ENTITIES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 
Stephen Kim Park* 
Amidst the expansion of cross-border financial regulation, conspicuously 
missing from recent scholarly inquiries is the question of how institutions 
owned and controlled by governments, such as central banks, international 
financial institutions, and sovereign wealth funds, should be regulated in their 
capacities as market participants.  The growth of these state-owned financial 
entities, coupled with the integral role of domestic and supranational regulators 
in promulgating, monitoring, and enforcing international financial rules, 
highlights a reversal of roles in the traditional regulatory framework—when 
governments as regulators become regulated subjects.  This Article considers 
the legal and policy implications of this phenomenon by examining the 
application of the competing legal doctrines that govern this dynamic:  
extraterritorial application of domestic regulation versus the privileges and 
immunities under international law afforded to entities owned by a foreign 
government or multiple governments.  The relative dearth of bright-line rules 
and the opaque nature of coordination mechanisms provide flexibility to 
regulators seeking to determine how to treat state-owned financial entities, but 
may also undermine the legitimacy of global financial regulation.  As a case 
study, this Article examines the regulation of international financial institutions 
under the Dodd-Frank Act.  To address the functional and normative 
shortcomings of the international financial architecture, I outline a global 
governance framework based on international comity to address the unique 
and wide-ranging implications of governments in the market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the many lessons learned in the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis is the challenge of managing the globalization of financial 
markets.  A wave of regulatory reforms across the globe has grappled with 
the effects of cross-border financial activities conducted by banks, funds, 
and other international pools of capital.  Governments, acting alone and in 
coordination with their regulatory counterparts in other countries, may 
exercise this authority by applying domestic law to foreign firms and to 
such firms’ cross-border and offshore activities.  The convergence of these 
distinct yet inevitably intertwined phenomena—the rising volume of global 
capital flows and the desire to regulate foreign entities and activities—has 
weighty implications for the future of international law and the 
management of the global economy. 
These developments have not come without controversy.  The 
projection of domestic regulatory authority abroad raises normative and 
doctrinal questions about the future of national sovereignty in a global legal 
order in which private actors may be subject to the jurisdiction of multiple 
governmental authorities.  This profoundly far-reaching debate, which has 
occupied scholars and practitioners alike for decades in areas such as 
corporate social responsibility, international human rights, and international 
trade regulation, has a newfound urgency due to the sheer size and 
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magnitude of global financial markets and their spillover effects on the rest 
of the international economy.1  Scholarly inquiry about its value, purpose, 
and proper scope may help clarify the legal mandates of domestic 
regulators and the strategic planning of financial institutions that function 
in this increasingly diverse and uncertain regulatory environment. 
This Article identifies and explores an overlooked dimension in this 
debate:  the status of market participants that are owned and/or controlled 
by the state.  States participate in global financial markets alongside private 
actors.  Indeed, the past few decades have witnessed the emergence and 
growth of market participants of an inherently public, governmental 
nature—among which include government agencies (such as finance 
ministries), central banks, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) that are owned and governed by their member 
states.2  These sovereign and supranational entities engage in a wide range 
of cross-border financial transactions with each other and private 
counterparties, including issuing debt, entering into derivative transactions, 
and investing in equities. 
Despite the prominence of state-owned financial entities in the U.S. 
and foreign financial markets, their regulation has been, by and large, 
addressed in an ad hoc, piecemeal manner that reflects the absence of any 
kind of settled practice or binding legal principle.  One reason is due to 
uncertainty about the extent to which privileges and immunities under 
international law apply to the market-based activities of these unique 
governmental entities.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that 
one state is not subject to the full force of rules applicable in another state.  
 
*  Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Connecticut School of Business.  
Many thanks to family, friends, and colleagues for feedback and support.  I wish to 
acknowledge the helpful insights of Chris Brummer, John Scott, and participants at the 2012 
ALSB Annual Conference and the 2013 Philadelphia JILSA workshop.  I also wish to thank 
the editors and staff of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their 
assistance.  The views expressed in this Article and any errors and omissions are mine 
alone. 
1.    See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational 
Governance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201 (2007) (globalizing developments in the transnational legal 
order); Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1099 (2011) (globalization and territorial governance in international human rights); 
Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and 
Environmental Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (2004) (enforcement mechanisms in 
international trade law); Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”:   Multinational Misconduct and 
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) (extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation). 
 2.  This Article refers to these entities collectively as “state-owned financial entities.”  
This Article does not directly address state-owned banks and other state-owned enterprises 
whose missions and activities are generally not public in nature. 
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Similarly, the distinct yet related doctrine granting privileges and 
immunities to international organizations is well established in 
international law.3  Nonetheless, as this Article shows, these doctrines are 
rife with ambiguity in practice due to the lack of clarity regarding the 
balancing of the sovereign prerogatives underlying regulatory authority and 
regulatory immunity.4  International privileges and immunities—whether 
expressly cited or implicitly relied on—have an effect on the level and kind 
of regulatory authority to which foreign state-owned financial entities may 
be subject.  In the United States, this phenomenon has been notably evident 
in ongoing administrative rulemaking pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act.5  
The unsettled status quo underscores the potential for policy incoherence 
arising from discord between centuries-old principles of international law 
and the Bretton Woods-era international economic system vis-à-vis the 
rapidly-changing nature and scope of modern-day international finance. 
International law—and the traditional framework of regulatory 
authority on which it is based—is premised on a command-and-control 
relationship between governments as regulators and private market 
participants as their regulated subjects.  The juxtaposition of international 
privileges and immunities with extraterritorial regulation of foreign 
sovereign and supranational entities exposes disjunctures in this 
relationship.  The consequences of inaction, albeit indirect, may be severe.  
Governance gaps may form if conflicts between these principles are 
resolved differently across jurisdictions, or there may be legal instability 
over time as regulators struggle to harmonize these principles to new kinds 
of state-owned financial entities and new kinds of financial activities.  
Perhaps the most troubling implication is the possibility of collective doubt 
among private market participants about the fundamental fairness of 
international privileges and immunities, which may damage the legitimacy 
of global financial regulation itself. 
On a broader conceptual plane, global financial regulation reflects the 
changing environment of international business, in which private actors 
engage with each other as well as with states to proscribe standards of 
 
 3.  This Article analyzes individually the privilege and immunity doctrines applicable 
to foreign governments and their instrumentalities and enterprises (hereinafter referred to as 
“sovereign immunity”) and to international organizations (hereinafter referred to as 
“intergovernmental immunity”), and collectively refers to these doctrines as they may apply 
to either or both types of state-owned financial entities as “international privileges and 
immunities.” 
 4.  The concept of “regulatory immunity,” as presented in this Article, describes the 
application of international privileges and immunities to regulatory authority exercised vis-
à-vis a foreign government or an international organization. 
 5.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
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conduct.6  As a means of mediating the conflicts and concerns raised by the 
extraterritorial regulation of state-owned financial entities, this Article 
looks towards these new forms of global governance.  While 
acknowledging their limitations, this Article suggests a framework based 
on coordinated standard-setting, mutual recognition, and interagency 
dialogue. 
This Article explores these issues in three parts.  Part I provides a brief 
overview of the extraterritorial dimensions of recent financial regulatory 
reforms, with a specific focus on the Dodd-Frank Act.  As a means of 
evaluating the process and effects of global financial regulation, the 
doctrinal and institutional tools of extraterritorial regulatory authority are 
identified and examined.  Drawing on recent scholarly insights in 
international economic law, traditional government-centric conceptions of 
domestic regulatory authority are compared to hybrid approaches that 
incorporate transgovernmental regulatory networks, international financial 
institutions, and non-state actors.  Part II begins by describing the sizable 
and evolving role of state-owned financial entities as market participants in 
global financial markets.  The cross-border financial transactions of these 
institutions reveal potential stress points in global financial regulation due 
to their unique status as sovereign and supranational entities.  Part II 
proceeds by exploring the privileges and immunities enjoyed by these 
actors under international law, and then considers how claims of regulatory 
immunity may complicate the formulation and enforcement of global 
financial rules.  The experience of international financial institutions in 
respect of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act regulating swap 
transactions is examined as an illuminating case study.  Part III explores the 
ramifications of this inversion of the roles of the regulator and the 
regulated, identifying the systemic concerns that this phenomenon raises.  
Drawing on insights and critiques raised by scholarship on network theory, 
legal pluralism, and social constructivism, Part III outlines a framework of 
global financial comity as a means of facilitating the identification, 
expression, and resolution of institutional conflicts.  These prescriptive 
measures, although in part a reflection of the unique status of state-owned 
financial entities, also reveal the extent to which questions of accountability 
and legitimacy permeate the governance of international business activities 
generally.  In the Conclusion, I suggest ways in which the insights offered 
 
 6.  This Article uses the term “global financial regulation” to refer to the regulation of 
foreign and transnational entities and cross-border financial activities, irrespective of its 
source or mode.  The extraterritorial application of domestic financial rules by individual 
governments—most notably, the United States—is thereby linked with the distinct, 
relatively nascent area of financial regulation based on informal rules and regulatory 
coordination among multiple governments.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
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in this Article may be more broadly applied to issues of financial 
regulation, global governance, and the future development of international 
law. 
I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE STATE: THE EXPANDING REACH OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Global financial regulation underscores the changing nature of state 
power.  Economic globalization has transformed the means by which 
sovereignty is exercised and therefore the exercise of regulatory authority.  
The following discussion describes this evolving movement in the context 
of global financial regulation, which features the extraterritorial exercise of 
domestic regulatory authority coupled with the proliferation of 
transnational networks of regulators. 
A. The Objectives and Limitations of Global Financial Regulation 
The 2008 financial crisis revealed the extent to which financial actors, 
markets, and activities have moved offshore, beyond the territorial reach of 
domestic regulators.  Although the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis that was 
its root cause was not inherently global in nature, the near-collapse of the 
world’s financial system demonstrated the interconnectedness of global 
financial markets and the shortcomings of regulatory approaches to 
maintain stability and mitigate systemic risk.7  Without a doubt, the 
financial crisis, reflecting the globalization of financial markets in the 
twenty-first century, was global in scope and effect.8 
Globalization has increased both the breadth and depth of modern 
finance—the scope of cross-border financial activities is enormous and 
unprecedented.9  In 2012, the size of international positions of banks was 
over U.S. $33 trillion, and the total amount outstanding of international 
 
 7.  See Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1582-86 (2011) (providing a framework for analyzing systemic risk 
in the global financial system).  Systemic risk, the avoidance of which is oft-cited as a key 
function of financial regulation, has three meanings:  (1) the correlated exposure of 
institutions and markets to external shock; (2) the potential for a chain reaction of failures 
due to the interconnectedness of institutions through counterparty relationships; and (3) the 
problem of contagion due to the spread of failures (or the fear of failures) across different 
industries or sectors.  HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 11-12 (2009). 
 8.  See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It 
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 268 (2011) (describing “global” systemic risk). 
 9.  See HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY, AND REGULATION 18-21 (19th ed. 2012) (analyzing the globalization of financial 
markets based on several metrics). 
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debt securities was approximately U.S. $21.6 trillion.10  The nominal value 
of derivative contracts is staggering, amounting to U.S. $639 trillion in 
notional amounts outstanding and U.S. $25 trillion in gross market value.11  
In the United States, foreign entities (among which may include 
corporations, banks and other financial institutions, and governments) issue 
securities in the U.S. capital markets, which may be listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange or sold directly to U.S. purchasers under certain conditions.12  
Foreign banks may operate in the United States, either on a cross-border 
basis or through the establishment of domestic branches or subsidiaries.13  
Most notably, the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market—which was 
largely self-regulated in the United States prior to the Dodd-Frank Act—
has been traditionally based on bilateral contracts between counterparties 
that may be domiciled anywhere.14 
The regulation of global finance consists of two distinct types of 
governmental engagement:  rulemaking and standard-setting, on the one 
hand, and prudential oversight and supervision, on the other.15  Supervisory 
authority is further sub-categorized into traditional prudential supervision, 
which concerns the safety and soundness of individual financial entities, 
and macroprudential supervision, which addresses the stability of the entire 
financial system.16  The risks resulting from regulatory gaps caused by 
antiquated domestic regimes and inadequate international coordination 
were exposed in unprecedented ways during the financial crisis and its 
aftermath.17  The Dodd-Frank Act can be viewed as a direct response.18 
 
 10.  Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, Statistical Annex (Dec. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qs1212.pdf. 
 11.  Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, Highlights of the BIS 
International Statistics (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212b.pdf.  Derivatives—such as futures, options, and 
swaps—are financial instruments whose value is based on or derived from other assets or 
variables.  The underlying asset may be anything from stock and bonds, to commodities, 
interest rates, currency rates, or a stock market index.  Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regulation, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. 279, 283-84 (2011). 
 12.  SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 91-93. 
 13.  MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 395-400 (3d ed. 2011). 
 14.  Arner, supra note 7, at 1584-85, 1602; Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of 
Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 422 (2001) (referring to the 
absence of regulation of many classes of derivatives).   
 15.  See Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in 
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 264 
(2010) (noting the distinction between rulemaking and supervision).  Supervision is the 
process by which regulators monitor the behavior of financial institutions and other market 
participants to ensure compliance with applicable rules and standards.  Id. at 265-66. 
 16.  Arner, supra note 7, at 1583-84. 
 17.  See id. at 1610-11 (arguing that opportunities for regulatory avoidance and 
arbitrage, as well as a lack of transparency of complex global financial institutions, were a 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, given the global scope of the financial 
activities that regulators around the world have sought to address, 
appraisals of the Dodd-Frank Act evoke fundamental questions about the 
objectives and effectiveness of the state as regulator.  According to certain 
impassioned observers, economic globalization has hastened the decline 
and eventual obsolescence of the modern Westphalian nation-state 
system.19  Others cite the lack of a centralized enforcement authority as 
evidence of the collective action problems among sovereigns that have 
beset the nation-state system for centuries.20  The fragmented nature of 
global financial regulation may also reflect the influence of private 
financial entities in rulemaking and standard-setting based on their narrow, 
self-interested objectives.21  In this respect, the regulation of global finance 
may present unique challenges to state authority because of the 
unparalleled mobility of portfolio capital, deeply intertwined relationships 
between governments and their respective countries’ banking sectors, and 
the consequential effect of risk across many distinct yet inter-connected 
counterparties.22  Due to the predominantly territorial basis for regulatory 
authority in financial services, foreign entities may be subject to varying 
levels of regulatory oversight depending on the nature of their transactions, 
their domicile, or other factors, which may give rise to regulatory arbitrage 
 
result of the structure of domestic, regional, and international regulation before the global 
financial crisis). 
 18.  See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON 
REG. 91, 97-108 (2012) (explaining how the Dodd-Frank Act improved management of 
systematic risk). 
 19.  See, e.g., THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION (1999) (suggesting that globalization has created a single global market that 
integrates capital, technology, and information across nations); see also Larry Catá Backer, 
Economic Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the 
Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141, 
145-54 (2006) (describing one perspective of the state as increasingly dependent on non-
state actors for power). 
 20.  See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 683, 701-16 (2012) (identifying shared and comparable characteristics of 
international financial law and the treaty-based hard international law regimes of the WTO 
and the EU). 
 21.  See Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2012) 
(arguing that the ineffectiveness and slow pace of foreign and international regulatory 
reform of OTC derivative markets warrants immediate, unilateral action by U.S. regulators). 
 22.  See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL 130-32 (2007) (describing the 
causes of inadequate regulation following the Latin American and East Asian financial 
crises of the 1990s); Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: 
Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719, 723 
(2010) (describing the effects of regulatory competition on regulatory effectiveness). 
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and the so-called race to the bottom.23  State regulatory power may be 
uniquely hampered in respect of foreign financial actors and their activities 
due to the latter’s ability to move across borders.24 
During the financial crisis, the absence of a global financial regulator 
with enforcement powers akin to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was glaring.25  As a response, there have been renewed calls for the 
establishment of a treaty-based international regime of varying substantive 
scope and institutionalization.26  The appeal of an intergovernmental body 
with lawmaking, monitoring, and coercive enforcement powers over 
financial activities is manifold.27  Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of 
the status quo and a desire to realize the broad aspirations of a post-Bretton 
Woods order, a global financial regulator appears highly unlikely for the 
foreseeable future.  Among other factors, this is due to the benefits that 
governments accrue by retaining rulemaking and supervisory autonomy:  
namely, the prerogative to selectively apply or change policies and 
practices based on national interest, which may include the preferences of 
domestic financial interests and firms.28  In any event, it is indisputable that 
 
 23.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003) (defining regulatory arbitrage as the 
movement of market competitors to jurisdictions that are unregulated, lightly regulated, or 
otherwise have relatively favorable regulations); see also Trachtman, supra note 22, at 742 
(describing a global “race to inappropriate laxity”). 
 24.  See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 
379 (2010). 
 25.  See Thomas Cottier, Challenges Ahead in International Economic Law, 12 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 3, 14 (2009) (observing, inter alia, that the financial crisis showed that state-based 
regimes were wholly inadequate). 
 26.  See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 186-87 (2011) (proposing an 
international treaty to govern the insolvency of financial institutions under the laws of the 
six most important countries); Barry Eichengreen, Not a New Bretton Woods but a New 
Bretton Woods Process, in WHAT G20 LEADERS MUST DO TO STABILISE OUR ECONOMY AND 
FIX THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25, 25-27 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Baldwin eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/G20_Summit%20vox.pdf (calling 
for the creation of a World Financial Organization equivalent to the WTO with a broad 
rulemaking and supervisory mandate); Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of 
“Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 
1130-33 (2012) (proposing a treaty-based framework for coordinating supervision and 
resolution of global systemically important financial institutions); Pan, supra note 15, at 
273-77 (advocating for the creation of an international body responsible for cross-border 
supervision). 
 27.  See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not 
Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 641 (2010) (noting the structural flaws and shortcomings of 
soft law based global financial regulation in comparison to the enforcement powers of the 
WTO). 
 28.  See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 269 (2011) (discussing the impracticability of having a single 
PARK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:06 AM 
748 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
the negotiation of an international treaty-based framework would be long 
and arduous due to the persistence of nationalistic and protectionist 
sentiments.29 
B. Extraterritoriality as an Instrument of Regulatory Power 
In light of newfound pressures on states arising from the globalization 
of finance, extraterritorial regulation offers various means to manage the 
activities of foreign financial institutions.  The following discussion 
identifies and analyzes these approaches, and explores the concerns that are 
implicated by extraterritoriality.  This overview is deliberately non-
exhaustive, focusing on areas and issues of most relevance to state-owned 
financial entities. 
1. How and To What Effect Extraterritorial Regulation is Exercised 
A cornerstone of the international legal system is territoriality, based 
on the idea that each sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction over its own 
territory.30  Domestic territoriality both reflects and furthers the principle of 
sovereignty by circumscribing the reach of state authority while reinforcing 
the absolute power of every state within its own borders.31  In accordance 
with this principle, U.S. financial law embraces the presumption that a 
country’s laws apply only to acts or events occurring within its territory.32 
One of the most profound changes in international relations has been 
the rise of extraterritoriality, or the extension of domestic law to activity 
outside of the country’s territory.33  In particular, the growing use of U.S. 
 
global financial regulator). 
 29.  See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United 
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 197 
(2010) (suggesting that despite the potential benefits of global regulatory harmonization of 
securities regulation, such process would be slow and evolutionary).  This was arguably 
evident in the area of international trade regulation by the nearly five decades between the 
signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the establishment of 
the WTO.  See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-44 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining the flawed 
constitutional beginnings of the GATT).   
 30.  See Parrish, supra note 1, at 1100-01. 
 31.  Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 
127 (2007). 
 32.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 33-35. 
 33.  See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 815, 841-56 (2009) (describing the displacement of treaty-based international 
law by transnational law). 
 Under international law, territorial jurisdiction includes subjective and objective 
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domestic law to regulate conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders has been 
at the forefront of this wave.  Transnational civil litigation in U.S. federal 
courts has been used to exert influence via judicial enforcement in a wide 
range of subject areas.34  Through a variety of administrative agency 
rulemaking and enforcement mechanisms, the United States, more than any 
other country, has projected its regulatory authority extraterritorially.35 
Mirroring these broad-based changes in other areas of global import, 
foreign financial institutions and offshore financial activities are 
increasingly governed by a web of domestic legal rules projected across 
national borders.  In the United States, federal regulatory authorities—such 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Reserve—supervise 
and proscribe certain conduct of foreign entities and offshore activities.  
Extraterritorial regulatory authority is exercised in a variety of distinct 
ways, reflecting a diverse array of public policy considerations.36  
Extraterritorial regulation falls into the following four categories, with 
illustrative examples from U.S. financial law and practice: 
 
TARGETED FOREIGN REGULATION.  Foreign entities may be subject to 
laws and/or administrative regulations directly and exclusively applied to 
them.  This sort of blunt force approach is relatively rare and applied 
narrowly in global financial regulation due to its blatantly discriminatory 
nature.37  Although this form of extraterritorial regulation is most 
 
forms.  Subjective territoriality provides a nation-state with jurisdiction over acts that occur 
within its territory that may have effects outside its territory.  Objective territoriality—
otherwise known as the “effects doctrine”—concerns conduct that occurs outside the nation-
state that has, or is intended to have, effect within its territory.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1) (1987); PETER MALANCZUK, 
AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (7th ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter Akehurst].  As further examined herein, the extrapolation of these principles is 
prevalent in the extraterritorial application of U.S. financial regulation. 
 34.  See Parrish, supra note 33, at 846-49 (describing and citing the use of 
extraterritorial domestic law in antitrust, securities regulation, intellectual property law, 
corporate law, bankruptcy, tax, criminal law, environmental law, civil rights, and labor); see 
also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 273-
80 (2006) (critiquing the application of territorial principles in transnational regulatory 
cases). 
 35.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 44-45 (referring to U.S. regulatory dominance as 
most closely resembling lex financiera). 
 36.  The overview of extraterritorial regulation that follows draws substantially from 
Chris Brummer’s description of regulatory strategies based on extraterritorial territoriality 
and direct extraterritoriality.  See Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: 
Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 504-09 (2010) (describing the 
various regulatory tactics asserted under territorial authority). 
 37.  See id. at 507 (noting that this form of extraterritorial regulation is “virtually non-
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commonly associated with laws pertaining to international human rights 
laws, such as the Alien Tort Statute, it does intersect the financial sector 
with respect to entities and activities of a nature that implicate national 
security interests.  For example, sanctions under U.S. law may be enforced 
against foreign central banks and other financial institutions wholly or 
partly owned by foreign governments that prevent such entities from 
transacting with American counterparties.38  Also, the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency 
committee that is authorized to review foreign investment with national 
security implications, may block acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign 
persons.39  A third example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
imposes civil liability and criminal sanctions on U.S. persons and certain 
foreign parties for bribery of foreign government officials, which may 
include representatives and agents of state-owned financial entities.40 
 
QUASI-TERRITORIAL REGULATION.  Foreign entities operating in the 
United States through affiliates, subsidiaries, and other instrumentalities are 
invariably subject to supervision and operational requirements by U.S. 
regulators, both at the federal and often state levels.  Extraterritorial 
regulation of domestic financial activities by domestically-domiciled 
 
existent” in the financial world due to the reluctance of courts to take on cases with little 
national security interest).   
 38.  The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), an agency within the Department of 
the Treasury, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted 
foreign countries, regimes, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States.  OFAC has the authority to impose controls on transactions 
and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction.  For example, OFAC prohibits U.S. depository 
institutions, including foreign branches, from servicing accounts of the government of Iran, 
including Iranian government-owned or -controlled banks.  See Iranian Transactions 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560 (2012) (detailing the prohibition of supplying various types of 
goods and services to Iran, as well as defining the scope of the prohibition). 
 39.  See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975) (ordering the establishment 
of CFIUS and establishing its responsibilities and authority).   
 40.  See DEPT. OF JUST. AND SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.  The FCPA neither specifically 
addresses nor excludes financial transactions or institutions, either as subjects or objects of 
prohibited conduct.  Nonetheless, it is plausible that aggressive FCPA enforcement may 
have a material negative effect on the financial activities of foreign state-owned financial 
entities that engage with counterparties subject to the FCPA.  See Brummer, supra note 36, 
at 507 (identifying the FCPA as an exception to the reluctance of courts to adjudicate 
extraterritoriality cases in the financial sector); see also Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial 
Firms on Sovereign Fund Bribes, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 14, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/pring/2011001-14/sec-probes-financial-firms-on-possible-
bribes-to-sovereign-wealth-funds.html (highlighting FCPA enforcement in respect of 
sovereign wealth funds). 
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foreign entities is particularly evident in two important areas of global 
financial regulation.  First, among the banking reforms promulgated by the 
Dodd-Frank Act are heightened prudential standards and financial 
institution resolution arrangements for systemically important financial 
institutions.41  Foreign banks may be directly subject to the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s supervision and resolution requirements on the basis of their 
capitalization, notwithstanding their compliance with standards in their 
home jurisdictions.42  Second, with respect to OTC derivatives trading, the 
possibility of quasi-territorial regulation has arisen most tellingly in the 
context of the definition of a “U.S. person” under the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Foreign financial institutions and other foreign market participants may be 
subject to derivatives rules through quasi-territorial regulation if their U.S.-
domiciled operations are considered to be U.S. persons.43  What makes this 
 
 41.  Dodd-Frank Act §§ 165-166, 204(a).  
 42.  To cite a prominent example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
has the authority to require a foreign bank with a U.S. presence to submit a resolution plan 
(commonly referred to as a “living will”), which outlines the liquidation to which it would 
be subject in the event of a failure.  See Greenberger, supra note 21, at 5 (commenting on 
the FDIC’s proposed rules to require living wills); see also Greene & Boehm, supra note 26, 
at 1104-05 (noting the potential conflicts between recovery and resolution planning 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act and international regulatory 
harmonization for multinational financial institutions). 
 43.  The CFTC has defined a “U.S. person” as: 
(i) Any natural person who is a resident of the U.S.; (ii) any corporation, 
partnership, LLC, business or other trust, association, joint-stock company, 
fund, or any form of enterprise similar to any of the forgoing that is either:  (A) 
organized or incorporated under the laws of the U.S. or has its principal place of 
business in the U.S., (“legal entity”) or (B) in which the direct or indirect 
owners thereof are responsible for the liabilities of such entity and one or more 
of such owners is a U.S. person; (iii) any individual account (discretionary or 
not) where the beneficial owner is a U.S. person; (iv) any commodity pool, 
pooled account, or collective investment vehicle (whether or not it is organized 
or incorporated in the U.S.) of which a majority ownership is held, directly or 
indirectly, by a U.S. person(s); (v) any commodity pool, pooled account, or 
collective investment vehicle the operator of which would be required to 
register as a commodity pool operator under the [Commodity Exchange Act]; 
(vi) a pension plan for the employees, officers, or principals of a legal entity 
with its principal place of business inside the United States; and (vii) an estate 
or trust, the income of which is subject to U.S. income tax, regardless of source. 
Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 
Fed. Reg. 41,214, 41,218 (proposed July 12, 2012).  This definition continues to be subject 
to administrative review and potential modification.  See Exemptive Order Regarding 
Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785 (July 22, 2013) 
(temporarily delaying implementation of new rules governing swaps under the Dodd-Frank 
Act). 
 Conversely, foreign affiliates or agencies of U.S.-based institutions, such as a 
foreign branch of a U.S. bank, may fall under the definition of U.S. person, and therefore be 
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mode of regulation profoundly powerful is the cross-border diffusion of 
national rules and standards within vertically-integrated multinational 
financial institutions.44  Among the foreign market participants that may be 
subject to these sorts of compliance costs are international financial 
institutions and sovereign wealth funds.45 
 
EFFECTS-BASED REGULATION.  Foreign entities may be subject to 
regulation for financial activities that have effects in the United States.  
Effects-based regulation follows the objective, or “protect[ive],” view of 
territoriality, based on the premise that the U.S. market and investors 
should be protected from foreign misconduct.46  Extraterritoriality disputes 
have arisen prominently with respect to the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).47  For nearly fifty 
years, foreign plaintiffs relied on the extraterritorial application of Rule 
10b-5 (promulgated pursuant to Section 10b of the Exchange Act) to file 
so-called “foreign-cubed” securities fraud suits against foreign defendants, 
alleging fraud in connection with a sale or purchase of securities in foreign 
markets.48  In June 2010, the Supreme Court set aside the “effects” test for 
 
subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s derivatives rules.  See 78 Fed. Reg. at 43,786, 43,789-90 
(July 22, 2013) (addressing the centralized clearing of swaps required by the Dodd-Frank 
Act and the applicability of this rule to foreign branches). 
 44.  The “upstream[ing]” of territorially applied regulatory rules from a local subsidiary 
to a foreign-domiciled parent company and its international affiliates may be attributable to 
a manager’s desire to reduce compliance and other transaction costs.  Brummer, supra note 
36, at 504-05.  Due to differences between the Dodd-Frank Act and non-U.S. regulatory 
regimes, there is the possibility of foreign entities being subject to overlapping, conflicting, 
or otherwise incongruent regulations.  See Christian A. Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC 
Derivative Regulation (Nov. 10, 2012), at 23, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169401 
(stating that foreign regulators have noted the possibility of overlapping and conflicts in 
derivative regulation).  
 45.  See Greenberger, supra note 21, at 6 (critiquing threats by the European Investment 
Bank and the European Central Bank not to trade OTC swaps with U.S. banks if they are 
subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing and collateral posting requirements); Victor 
Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (2009) (proposing 
the repeal of the implicit tax subsidy granted to sovereign wealth funds under a theory of 
sovereign immunity pursuant to section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 46.  Turley, supra note 1, at 615. 
 47.  The Exchange Act grants jurisdiction to U.S. federal district courts for “conduct 
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the 
United States.”  Exchange Act §27(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).  Section 10b of the 
Exchange Act requires that a plaintiff prove that a defendant made a material omission or 
misrepresentation connected with the purchase or sale of a security with scienter, causing 
economic loss to the plaintiff due to reliance on that omission or misrepresentation.  Id. at § 
10b (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b)). 
 48.  See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1072, 1083-84 
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securities fraud actions by establishing a bright-line transactional test that 
limited the application of Section 10b to purchases or sales made in the 
United States or involving securities listed on a domestic exchange.49  Just 
one month later, Congress responded by including a provision in the Dodd-
Frank Act that establishes federal jurisdiction in cases filed by the SEC or 
the Department of Justice.50  Effects-based regulation is also expressly set 
forth in the new derivatives rules of the Dodd-Frank Act, which establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities outside the U.S. that “have a 
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce 
of the United States; or (2) contravene such rules or regulations . . . as are 
necessary . . . to prevent the evasion of any provision of the [Dodd-Frank 
Act] . . . .”51 
 
CONDUCT-BASED REGULATION.  Foreign entities may be subject to 
regulation by U.S. regulators on the basis of transactions with U.S. 
counterparties (or U.S.-domiciled foreign counterparties) or through U.S. 
conduits.52  Foreign financial institutions and other foreign market 
participants that transact with U.S. counterparties or through U.S. agents, 
exchanges, bank accounts, or clearing systems may therefore be subject to 
U.S. regulation even if their activities are undertaken offshore, the U.S. 
counterparties or conduits act through foreign instrumentalities, and there 
are no effects on the U.S. market or investors.53  The broad sweep of this 
 
(2010) (defining “foreign-cubed” lawsuits). 
 49.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  This case has attracted 
substantial scholarly attention.  See, e.g., Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud 
Litigation after Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based 
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249 (2012) (discussing the narrowed 
scope of Rule 10b-5 under the new test); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? 
International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s 
“Transactional Test”, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405 (2012) (noting the shortcomings of the new 
test and proposing an alternate effects test). 
 50.  Section 929(P) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, in relevant part: 
(c) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.—The district courts of the United States and the 
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction . . . alleging a 
violation of [the antifraud provisions of this title] involving—“(1) conduct 
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the 
violation, even if the violation is committed by a foreign adviser and involves 
only foreign investors; or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that 
has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” 
Dodd-Frank Act § 929 (P). 
 51.  Dodd-Frank Act § 722 (for swaps) and § 772(c) (for security-based swaps).   
 52.  See Johnson, supra note 44, at 2. 
 53.  An illuminating example is found in the regulation of derivatives under the Dodd-
Frank Act.  CFTC rules require a U.S. person to comply with transaction-level rules (i.e., 
requirements that apply to each swap transaction, such as clearing, margin, and real-time 
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extraterritorial approach is evident in the “conduct” test that was the 
counterpart to the “effects” test in securities antifraud actions under the 
Exchange Act.54  The conduct test established federal subject matter 
jurisdiction if foreign investors could demonstrate harm as a result of 
conduct emanating from the United States.  In essence, this test looks at the 
situs and the materiality of the conduct in question, regardless of the 
location of the parties or the markets where the transaction took place.55  
This approach, like the effects test, has been criticized for its inconsistent 
and unpredictable application, weighing against the tremendous discretion 
that it gives judges to remedy alleged harms committed beyond the 
territorial reach of U.S. laws.56  As with the effects test, the Dodd-Frank 
Act expressly provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the 
conduct test.57 
The efficacy of any of these kinds of extraterritorial regulatory 
authority is contingent on highly concentrated state power.  That is, the 
ability of a country to project its regulatory rules on foreign entities and 
offshore economic activity depends on its status as an economic hegemon, 
such as the United States, whose own internal market is powerful enough 
 
reporting) in respect of any swap, regardless of where the transaction is actually conducted.  
Since the definition of U.S. person covers foreign banks whose principal place of business is 
in the United States, a foreign-based bank with significant operations in the United States 
may fall under the definition of U.S. person and thereby be required to comply with the 
Dodd-Frank Act for all of its swaps activities worldwide—in spite of any overlapping or 
conflicting regulatory requirements in their home countries.  See Final Exemptive Order 
Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 858, 863-64 (Jan. 7, 
2013) (stating that the CFTC will not treat entities incorporated or organized outside the 
United States and with a principal place of business in the United States as a “U.S. person” 
until April 1, 2013).  
 54.  The Exchange Act provides jurisdiction to U.S. federal district courts for “conduct 
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, 
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign 
investors.”  Exchange Act §27(b)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).  
 55.  See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 543 (2011) 
(describing the conduct test and the challenges in applying it). 
 56.  See Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-
Squared Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 515, 517-18 (2012) (discussing the various applications of the effects test before 
Morrison). 
 57.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(1) (amending the Securities Act to adopt the 
conduct test).  Commentators have noted the incongruence between the apparent 
Congressional intent to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison and the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the effects and conducts tests on the basis of the substantive 
scope of Section 10(b) and not due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Richard W. 
Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed 
or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199-205 (2011). 
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either to deter or mitigate the negative effects of retaliation by foreign 
regulators.58  However, the relative decline in the international financial 
market dominance of the United States, along with the proliferation of new 
sources of financial capital and the emergence of competing regulators in 
new markets, may materially hinder the United States’ ability to regulate in 
this manner.59  Financial globalization may impose a double-bind on U.S. 
financial regulators by fostering new forms of cross-border financial 
activities in unprecedented volume, while simultaneously hindering their 
ability to manage and supervise the sources of these activities. 
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law is circumscribed, both 
expressly and implicitly, by canons of construction and principles of 
American constitutional law.60  First and foremost is the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, which posits that a law should be interpreted to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States absent 
express congressional intent of its extraterritorial reach.61  Another canon of 
construction is the Charming Betsy canon, derived from Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s statement that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”62  
These canons reflect the fundamental importance of the doctrine of comity 
as a principle of national decisionmaking.  Comity is defined as “the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation.”63  Judicial pronouncements 
rejecting the extraterritorial reach of domestic law are often clothed in the 
language of comity through the application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy canon, which establish a 
rebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality that may only be 
overcome by clear, explicit, and irrefutable evidence of legislative intent to 
the contrary.  Comity, when applied in this manner by a court, can serve as 
a flexible tool of judicially-imposed abnegation of domestic statutory 
 
 58.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 40-43 (describing the “political economy” 
problem of extraterritorial regulation). 
 59.  Id. at 45-49 (citing the factors for the weakening of American financial dominance 
and the effects on extraterritorial regulatory export by the United States). 
 60.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 
402-03 (1987) (detailing the current status of the jurisdiction to prescribe under U.S. law).  
Although there is no express prohibition in the Constitution on the promulgation of 
extraterritorial legislation by Congress, the specific congressional powers in the Constitution 
pursuant to which Congress may legislate extraterritorially include potential limits on this 
authority.  See Colangelo, supra note 31, at 136-58 (analyzing the Offence Clause, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, and the Foreign Affairs Power).   
 61.  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 62.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).  
 63.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895). 
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authority.64  Existing doctrines and practices, however, are too inchoate and 
narrowly applied to provide a consistent, predictable basis for addressing 
the tensions between extraterritorial jurisdiction and national sovereignty in 
the context of regulatory authority.65 
2. Transnational Governance: Extraterritorial Regulation by Other 
Means 
The limitations of extraterritorial regulation reflect the evolving, 
multilayered environment of international finance.  Extraterritoriality is but 
one component of the set of rules, resources, and institutions that manage 
international financial and monetary affairs—the so-called international 
financial architecture.  The political and legal constraints faced by 
governmental authorities seeking to regulate extraterritorially, coupled with 
the limits of treaty-based regimes, have led countries in the past several 
decades to explore new forms of global financial regulation.  The global, 
broadly inter-connected nature of market participants and their activities 
reinforces the need for governments to address obstacles to regulatory 
coordination, particularly given the newfound emphasis on identifying and 
managing systemic risk following the global financial crisis. 
Regulatory authority is increasingly exercised through multiple, 
overlapping regulatory frameworks that feature a wide constellation of 
stakeholders and cross several distinct jurisdictional boundaries.66  To 
facilitate international coordination and cooperation in the absence of a 
global financial regulator, new models of transnational economic regulation 
have emerged, consisting of a latticework of predominantly non-binding 
rules, standards, and best practices developed by national regulatory 
agencies, private standard-setting bodies, international financial 
institutions, and various non-state actors.67  These new forms of global 
governance eschew state-centric regulation and mandatory rules for 
rulemaking based on consultation, soft law norms, and the direct and/or 
 
 64.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity”, 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 
906-38 (1998) (analyzing the circumstances in which courts may apply comity). 
 65.  See infra Part III.A. 
 66.  See Rolf H. Weber, Multilayered Governance in International Financial 
Regulation and Supervision, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 683, 685-86 (2010) (describing the limited 
scope and enforcement powers of traditional international law instruments and the 
fragmentation of global financial regulation). 
 67.  See Anu Piiola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of 
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 207, 208-09 (2003) (defining 
transgovernmental and transnational models of global governance as well as traditional 
intergovernmental governance and concluding that none of them alone is sufficient or 
desirable). 
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indirect participation of non-state actors.68 
One particular model of global governance, transgovernmental 
regulatory networks, involves regulation through self-interested domestic 
regulators working in close coordination across national borders, instead of 
being confined within the administrative rulemaking and strategic decision-
making processes of individual states.69  The regulation of various areas of 
global finance has been a productive area for these kinds of networks.  The 
Financial Stability Board, established by the G20 in 2009 to coordinate 
financial policies globally, includes the central banks and finance ministries 
from most G20 member countries and a number of international financial 
institutions and standard-setting bodies.70  In the banking sector, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, which formulated the 1988 Basel 
Accord on capital adequacy (known as Basel I), arguably constitutes the 
apex of network-based global lawmaking, and has continued its work in the 
formulation of new capital adequacy standards under Basel I’s successors, 
Basel II and Basel III.71  In regards to securities regulation, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and various bilateral 
cooperative agreements have played an important role in global standard-
setting.72  With respect to the regulation of the global OTC derivatives 
market, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly mandates that the SEC, CFTC, and 
prudential regulators (such as the Federal Reserve) engage in consultation 
and coordination with their foreign regulatory counterparts.73  Similarly, 
transnational private networks have worked alongside public transnational 
institutions to reduce systemic risk through the implementation of 
mandatory central counterparty clearing of swaps.74 
 
 68.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541-45 (2009) (describing decentralized transnational governance 
schemes). 
 69.  See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 
(2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of 
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 312-25 (1998).  
See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 505 (distinguishing transgovernmental 
regulatory networks from other transnational governance schemes run by private actors). 
 70.  See Greene & Boehm, supra note 26, at 1090-91. 
 71.  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 132-43 (2009). 
 72.  See Raustiala, supra note 69, at 28-35; Zaring, supra note 69, at 292-97. 
 73.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 752. 
 74.  See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case 
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 678-80 (2010) (detailing the 
role of transnational networks in causing regulatory convergence).  Swaps, a type of 
derivative instrument, consist of customized legal contracts based on standardized industry 
models that are privately negotiated and settled by counterparties to provide each other with 
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Viewed in their best light, these networks represent the zenith of the 
“disaggregated state”:  the constitutive components of national 
governments collectively acting as a world government, in function but not 
form.75  However, the transformational effects of networks on the 
international economic system are unsettled.76  Further, their limitations 
reveal the salience of problems in global financial regulation that are shared 
by extraterritorial regulation.  Indeed, these global governance 
mechanisms—rather than supplanting domestic regulation—instead 
complement and augment extraterritorial regulatory authority.77  The 
coordination rationale for transgovernmental regulatory networks—
specifically, the desire of domestic regulators to find quicker, more 
efficient ways to cooperate across borders—hints at the extent to which 
domestic politics might dominate the regulatory process.  Far from 
occupying a global technocratic space removed from the vagaries of 
domestic lawmaking, transgovernmental regulatory networks may shape 
and perpetuate the preferences of domestic interests and the underlying 
state power of their participants.78  Notwithstanding the shift away from 
traditional modes of government-dictated regulatory authority based on 
command-and-control, these new forms of global governance complement 
and augment domestic extraterritorial power rather than supplanting or 
compromising it.79  Governments continue to assert their sovereign 
authority over non-state actors.80  Rather than being modulated by informal 
 
a series of cash flows.  In contrast to futures and options, swaps are not based on the 
physical exchange of underlying assets.  They are used to hedge risk, lower funding costs, 
and for speculative purposes, among other reasons.  See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 
959-64. 
 75.  See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (discussing the 
role of transgovernmental networks of regulators as an integral component of a “new world 
order”). 
 76.  See Verdier, supra note 71, at 161-70; Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises 
and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 548-53 
(2012) (addressing doubts about the effectiveness of the G20 coordinating functions in the 
wake of the global financial crisis). 
 77.  See Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INT’L STUD. REV. 
53, 76-77 (2001) (noting that changes in the international economic system induced by 
globalization have affected the bargaining modus operandi of state regulatory power but 
have not inexorably diminished it). 
 78.  See Verdier, supra note 71, at 161-62; Brummer, supra note 27, at 642; Cho & 
Kelly, supra note 76, at 555-56. 
 79.  See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to 
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 839-41 (2010) (evaluating the use of risk models in regulatory 
regimes). 
 80.  See DREZNER, supra note 22, at 19-22 (describing and critiquing global civil 
society theories of globalization). 
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consultative processes, the state remains the cornerstone of global financial 
regulation, and the regulatory reach of powerful states is augmented as a 
result of their ability to encourage, persuade, or compel their foreign 
regulatory counterparts to adopt their preferred regulatory models.81 
II. THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES AND LEGAL TREATMENT OF STATE-
OWNED FINANCIAL ENTITIES 
The expanding scope of global financial regulation reflects the 
collective desire to respond to the risks of financial globalization.  The 
rationale for regulation rests on the balancing of the public interest with the 
private interests of market participants.  This dynamic is complicated in the 
case of state-owned financial entities, whose legal character reflects their 
uniquely public missions.  Most importantly, their immunities and 
privileges from jurisdiction have been long enshrined under international 
law.  The normative and operational implications of extraterritorial 
regulation are underscored by the unique role of the state as a market 
participant. 
The following discussion describes this unique class of entities and 
their growing engagement in the financial markets as well as their 
increasingly important role as global financial regulators.  This analysis 
may also provide insights applicable to state-owned banks and other state-
owned enterprises with non-public missions, which are not directly 
addressed in this Article.  It provides an overview of the distinct, yet related 
doctrines of sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity.  An in-
depth examination of the experience of international financial institutions 
in respect of the Dodd-Frank Act’s derivatives rules suggests how 
international privileges and immunities may limit, preclude, or condition 
the regulation of the financial activities of IFIs and other state-owned 
financial entities. 
A. The Structure and Activities of State-Owned Financial Entities in 
Global Financial Markets 
State-owned financial entities participate in global financial markets in 
a variety of ways.  They engage in borrowing and lending operations with 
private banks and other financial institutions.  They issue bonds in global 
securities markets.  They use swaps and other derivatives instruments to 
hedge risk.  They invest in debt and equity through investment funds. 
 
 81.  See Raustiala, supra note 69, at 56-61 (describing network-driven regulatory 
convergence). 
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The major classes of state-owned financial entities with a substantial 
presence in global financial markets include: 
 
CENTRAL BANKS.  Central banks are governmental institutions with 
wide-ranging monetary and regulatory responsibilities, among which 
include setting interest rates, controlling the country’s money supply (open 
market operations), managing foreign exchange reserves, supervising the 
banking system, and serving as the government’s banker.82  In these 
capacities, central banks lend and borrow from private banks to determine 
market interest rates, and also make available loans to distressed private 
financial institutions as a lender of last resort.83  Central banks buy and sell 
debt securities and use foreign currency swaps to conduct open market 
operations and manage their foreign exchange reserves.84  Many central 
banks issue their own debt securities to facilitate exchange rate and 
liquidity policy objectives.85  They are generally owned by a central 
government and organized as a separate legal entity.86 
 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFIS).  IFIs are financial 
institutions established and owned by multiple governments.  The most 
prominent and influential IFIs are the Bretton Woods institutions 
established after World War II:  the IMF and the World Bank.87  Alongside 
 
 82.  The breadth of central bank operations and policies is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For further discussion of central bank policies, see HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL 
BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION (Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato 
Masciandaro eds., 2011). 
 83.  See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 43-46, 262-63 (describing the Federal 
Reserve Bank’s use of its discount window); see also Note, Too Sovereign to be Sued: 
Immunity of Central Banks in Times of Financial Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REV. 550, 565-66 
(2010) (describing central banks’ liquidity support during the global financial crisis) 
[hereinafter HLR Note]. 
 84.  See Catharina J. Hooyman, The Use of Foreign Exchange Swaps by Central Banks: 
A Survey (IMF Working Paper No. 93/64, Aug. 1993), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=1139 (discussing the use and 
problems with foreign exchange swaps). 
 85.  See Andrew Filardo, Madhusudan Mohanty & Ramon Moreno, Central Bank and 
Government Debt Management: Issues for Monetary Policy, in FISCAL POLICY, PUBLIC 
DEBT AND MONETARY POLICY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 51, 54-55, 66-68 (BIS 
Papers No. 67, Oct. 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap67d_rh.pdf 
(looking at the growth of the government debt market).  The Federal Reserve Bank does not 
issue its own bonds.  See Robert Cyran & Dwight Cass, Reducing Debt, But Also Prospects, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at B2 (criticizing the prospect of the Federal Reserve Bank 
issuing its own bonds). 
 86.  See Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 350-51 (2003). 
 87.  The World Bank Group consists of five institutions, most of which are devoted to 
economic development:  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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the World Bank are numerous other multilateral development banks that 
provide financing and technical assistance for development-related 
purposes in specific regions, most notably: the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB).  IFIs are international organizations, established 
pursuant to international treaties and governed by their member states.88  
These institutions issue debt securities to institutional and retail investors in 
capital markets throughout the world to fund their operations.89  They use 
derivatives to hedge market risks in lending, borrowing, equity 
management, and investment operations.90 
 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (SWFS).  Sovereign wealth funds are 
investment vehicles that are owned by governments, funded by foreign 
exchange assets, and managed separately from official reserves.91  These 
funds have been subject to growing scrutiny in recent years due to their 
shift from conservative debt instruments to comparatively higher-yielding 
equities—most notably, acquisitions of partial ownership stakes in private 
financial entities such as Blackstone, Morgan Stanley, and UBS.92  
 
(IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 88.  See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2 
U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter IBRD 
Articles of Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, Aug. 4, 
1963, 510 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AfDB Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the Asian 
Development Bank, Aug. 22, 1966, 571 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ADB Agreement]; 
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mar. 28, 
1991, 29 I.L.M. 1083 [hereinafter EBRD Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the Inter-
American Development Bank, Dec. 30, 1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter IDB Charter]. 
 89.  IBRD alone borrows approximately U.S. $30 billion a year through bond 
issuances.  See Everything you always wanted to know about the World Bank, THE WORLD 
BANK, http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBankFacts.pdf (last visited May 15, 
2014).  
 90.  See, e.g., IBRD, Management’s Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements, 
at 7, 81-88 (June 30, 2012), available at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/IBRD_MDA_and_Financial_Statements_June_2012.
pdf (describing IBRD’s use of swaps to hedge interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk).  
IBRD also offers derivatives intermediation services to its developing country borrowers.  
See id. at 14, 81 (describing the IBRD’s uses of derivative instruments). 
 91.  Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 102, 103 (2008).  Among 
the largest and most active SWFs are Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the China Investment Corporation, and Temasek Holdings 
of Singapore. 
 92.  See Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth 
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Regulatory concerns specific to SWFs have focused on the specter of their 
political influence on investment decisions.93 
Regulation of these state-owned financial entities by foreign and 
international regulators addresses a number of policy considerations.  State-
owned financial entities are sometimes subject to the same requirements as 
their private sector counterparts, with no expressly different treatment due 
to their sovereign or supranational status.94  In other instances, they are 
subject to special requirements, such as the disclosure rules of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) for foreign governmental 
issuers.95  Alternatively, they are exempted from certain regulatory 
requirements due to their sovereign or supranational status.96  State-owned 
financial entities may be subject to special regulation if they engage in 
certain types of financial activities or fail to meet certain industry-
determined standards.97  The application of international privileges and 
 
Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 116 (2009). 
 93.  See Lawrence Summers, Funds That Shake Capitalist Logic, FIN. TIMES, July 29, 
2007 (raising concerns about SWFs’ pursuit of objectives other than maximizing risk-
adjusted returns, such as extracting technology from companies or exerting political 
influence over host country governments). 
 94.  See Epstein & Rose, supra note 92, at 117-18 (noting that SWFs are subject to the 
Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements under Section 13(d) and anti-fraud provisions of 
federal securities, antitrust, and state corporate laws). 
 95.  See Securities Act § 7 Information Required on Registration Statement (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 77g); see also Edward F. Greene & Ronald Adee, The Securities of Foreign 
Governments, Political Subdivisions and Multinational Organizations, 10 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 1, 6-16 (1985) (detailing disclosure requirements of foreign governments that 
issue securities in the U.S.). 
 96.  Numerous examples abound in various areas of financial regulation.  For example, 
the World Bank and regional multilateral development banks are exempt from the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act and the disclosure requirements of the 
Exchange Act.  Instead, each institution is required only to file its annual report, quarterly 
financial reports, and advance reports of any distributions in the United States.  See 22 
U.S.C. § 286k-1 (IBRD); 22 U.S.C. § 290i-9 (AfDB); 22 U.S.C. § 285h (ADB); 22 U.S.C. § 
290l-7 (EBRD); 22 U.S.C. § 283h (IDB); see also Greene & Adee, supra note 95, at 24-28 
(discussing the historical development of securities disclosure requirements).  Another 
example is Basel I’s treatment of sovereign debt.  Under Basel I capital adequacy rules, debt 
issued by the Federal Reserve Bank and other OECD-member central banks were granted 
zero risk weighting, thereby granting preferential treatment to such sovereigns vis-à-vis 
other securities issuers.  See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 566 (summarizing credit 
risk under Basel I). 
 97.  The Santiago Principles, a voluntary code of conduct created by certain 
governments that own SWFs, establishes an equivalency standard for SWFs, stipulating that 
host countries shall “not subject SWF[s] to any requirement, obligation, restriction, or 
regulatory action exceeding that to which other investors in similar circumstances may be 
subject” so long as SWFs operate “in compliance with all applicable regulatory and 
disclosure requirements.”  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles” 
(Oct. 2008), GAPP 15 Principle, Explanation and Commentary, available at 
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immunities may result in a complete or partial exemption from regulation 
of a given class of state-owned entity or certain conditions on their 
regulation.98 
Within the panorama of financial globalization and global financial 
regulation, the activities of state-owned financial entities as market 
participants are important in two respects.  First, the growth and 
proliferation of state-owned financial entities means that they will continue 
to transact with and, in certain contexts, compete against their private 
sector counterparts.99  Second, the regulatory footprint of some of these 
very same market participants has continued to evolve and expand.  Central 
banks, within their own respective jurisdictions and in coordination with 
each other, engage in macroprudential supervision.100  Another important 
element of global financial regulation is the role of IFIs.  The regulatory 
authority of the IMF, the World Bank, and other IFIs has been traditionally 
restricted by the limited legal scope of their missions.101  Although their 
capacity to regulate through conditionality (i.e., by making financial and 
technical assistance to borrowers conditional on the implementation of 
domestic regulatory standards or policies) is limited by demand for their 
 
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.  See also Larry Catá Backer, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investments, 41 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 425, 448 (2010); Joseph J. Norton, The “Santiago Principles” and the 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton 
Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global 
Administrative Networking and Related “Soft” Rulemaking?, 29 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 465, 512-18 (2010) (describing the scope of the Santiago Principles). 
 98.  See infra Part II.C. 
 99.  IFIs have established investment companies that manage funds on behalf of third 
party clients.  One notable example is the IFC Asset Management Company (AMC), a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation, 
which invests public and private funds in IFC co-financed projects.  As of March 31, 2012, 
AMC had approximately U.S. $4.2 billion in assets under management.  See IFC Asset 
Management Company, Issue Brief, 
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3e284300486a6c72bc9afff995bd23db/SM12_IFCIss
ueBrief_AMC.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited May 15, 2014). 
 100.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury to consult 
with foreign regulatory counterparts and international organizations in respect of matters 
relating to systemic risk and prudential regulation.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 175(b) and (c), 12 
U.S.C. § 5373 (2012); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Speech at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation 
(May 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf (discussing 
macroprudential policy in the United States). 
 101.  See Pan, supra note 15, at 251; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 533-37 
(noting the weak governance powers of traditional intergovernmental organizations). 
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resources, the significant uptick in their lending activities in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis refutes concerns of their obsolescence.102  The 
surveillance and monitoring responsibilities of the World Bank and the 
IMF, both of macroeconomic stability generally as well as financial codes 
and standards specifically, are unique in the international system.103  The 
role of IFIs to promote best practices through technical assistance and 
economic analysis, though not formalized as a regulatory power per se, 
underscores the broad-based roles of these institutions in structuring 
financial markets.104 
B. International Privileges and Immunities under International Law 
State-owned financial entities may seek exemption from 
extraterritorial regulation on the basis of international privileges and 
immunities, a diverse set of principles under international law for the 
benefit of states and international organizations.  Their diverse rationales 
and applications, coupled with uncertainty regarding their relevance to the 
regulation of financial activities, necessitate a closer examination. 
1. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity permits a state to claim freedom 
from the jurisdiction of a foreign state.105  Sovereign immunity developed 
 
 102.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 147-50.  But see David Zaring, International 
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 490-93 (2010) (arguing that the 
IMF has a narrow role in the international financial architecture solely relevant to 
developing countries). 
 103.  See Brummer, supra note 8, at 281-82 (discussing the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program and financial sector assessments included in Reports on Observance and Codes 
issued by the IMF and the World Bank).  But see Pan, supra note 15, at 252 n.26 (noting the 
lack of authority in the IMF Articles of Agreement to directly monitor private firms). 
 104.  The World Bank’s Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency, 
which includes programs devoted to financial systems, financial infrastructure, financial 
market integrity, and corporate governance, is one example. 
 105.  In this context, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has developed to address its 
application at distinct stages of the judicial process:  (i) foreign state immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another state to adjudicate a claim against it (immunity from 
jurisdiction); and (ii) the exemption of a foreign state from enforcement of an adverse 
judgment through attachment and execution of its state property (immunity from attachment 
and execution).  Akehurst, supra note 33, at 118.  It may be contrasted to the invocation of 
international privileges and immunities in the context of exercises of regulatory authority—
i.e., regulatory immunity. 
The Act of State doctrine is the most notable example of a doctrine related to, but 
doctrinally distinct from, sovereign immunity.  Under U.S. law, the Act of State doctrine 
provides that U.S. courts will not judge the validity of official acts of a foreign government 
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from the nation-state system, based on the sanctity of national sovereignty 
and the principle of non-interference by any one state in the internal affairs 
of any other.  Traditionally, the practice and policies of the United States 
were based on the theory of absolute immunity, which granted foreign 
states immunity for all their activities.106  Marked by the Tate Letter in 
1952, the United States adopted the “restrictive” approach to immunity, 
which distinguishes between a foreign state’s governmental acts (jure 
imperii) and its private acts (jure gestionis), the latter of which are not 
entitled to sovereign immunity.107 
The restrictive approach was codified in U.S. law by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, which vests responsibility for 
immunity determinations by the U.S. government with the federal 
judiciary.108  The FSIA establishes a general rule of sovereign immunity 
with certain specific, statutorily-defined exceptions.109  A key consideration 
with respect to sovereign immunity revolves around the definition of a 
foreign state.  The FSIA expressly includes in its definition of foreign state 
a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state.110  Government ministries and central banks are afforded the 
 
carried out in its own territory.  See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).  
Much like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Act of State doctrine has been applied in 
an ad hoc manner in respect of the enforcement of foreign sovereign contracts, leading to 
unpredictability in international commercial transactions with foreign government 
counterparties.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 
39 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 2-4, 46-51 (1998) (discussing the application of the Act of State 
doctrine). 
 106.  See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 n.1 
(1989). 
 107.  See Letter of Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, Jack B. Tate, to 
Department of Justice (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26 Dep’t. State Bull. 984 (1952); see 
also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–715 (1976) (quoting 
the same). 
 108.  Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in various sections of Title 28 
of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter FSIA].  The FSIA governs both immunity from jurisdiction 
and immunity from attachment and execution.  The following discussion addresses the rules 
that apply to the former due to its nexus with the right of a foreign state to assert regulatory 
immunity. 
 Multilateral initiatives have had modest success and limited effects on state 
practice.  The European Convention on State Immunity entered into force in 1976, and 
includes eight signatory parties.  See European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 
1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).  The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of states to enter into force.  See 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. 
Res. 59/38 U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004).   
 109.  The FSIA provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the United States . . . except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this 
chapter.”  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010).   
 110.  Id. at § 1603(a). 
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protections of the FSIA, as well as many other state-owned financial 
entities.111  Nonetheless, there is uncertainty regarding the extent to which a 
separately-managed state-owned entity (such as a SWF) would be treated 
differently from an entity with a discrete pool of assets but without legal 
personality separate from the state.112 
The FSIA enumerates nine categorical exceptions to sovereign 
immunity—most notably, the waiver exception and the commercial activity 
exception.113  The waiver exception concerns the waiver by a foreign state 
of its sovereign immunity, either explicitly or by implication.114  Explicit 
waivers constitute a contractual agreement by a foreign state to forego the 
default rule of immunity in the context of negotiated financial 
transactions.115  The commercial activity exception, in contrast, strips the 
protections of sovereign immunity whenever a foreign state engages in a 
course of conduct, a particular transaction, or an act that is commercial in 
nature, regardless of its purpose.116  Under this reasoning, the commercial 
activity exception applies to any type of conduct that a private party could 
 
 111.  The FSIA broadly defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” to cover 
any entity:  
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and  
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state 
or political subdivision thereof, and  
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created 
under the laws of any third country. 
Id. at § 1603(a) and (b). 
However, indirect state ownership of a firm, such as through a holding company, 
does not qualify.  See generally Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) 
(examining if and how sovereign immunity applies to firms owned by a foreign state). 
 112.  See David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government 
Controlled Investors (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/2, 2010), at 
14-18, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/45036449.pdf; HLR Note, supra 
note 83, at 558-63 (describing the efforts of litigants seeking attachment of central bank 
assets based on the argument that central banks are the corporate “alter ego” of their state 
parents). 
 113.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2010) (setting forth the FSIA’s specific exceptions to 
immunity from jurisdiction).  The other exceptions to sovereign immunity specified in the 
FSIA are based on: expropriation; property in the United States; tort injury occurring in the 
United States; arbitration; torture, extrajudicial killing, sabotage, or kidnapping; 
enforcement of a maritime lien; and foreclosure of a maritime mortgage. 
 114.  Id. at § 1605(a)(1). 
 115.  See Lee, supra note 86, at 338-39. 
 116.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2010) (defining commercial activity); see also Republic 
of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992) (applying the commercial activity 
exception to the rescheduling of bonds issued by the Government of Argentina and 
determining that it was “irrelevant why Argentina participated in the bond market in the 
manner of a private actor; it matters only that it did so”). 
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similarly conduct.117  The commercial activity exception provides 
jurisdiction based upon a nexus with the United States established by:  (i) 
“a commercial activity carried on in the United States”; (ii) “an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity” 
elsewhere; or (iii) “an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere” if the 
“act causes a direct effect in the United States.”118 
2. The Doctrine of Intergovernmental Immunity 
The privileges and immunities of international organizations, or 
intergovernmental immunity, share the underlying principles of sovereign 
immunity.  Intergovernmental immunity is expressly incorporated into the 
international treaties by which IFIs are governed.119  The application of 
intergovernmental immunity reflects its distinct doctrinal foundations and 
purposes.  The creation of international organizations in the mid-nineteenth 
century spurred their member states to endow them with diplomatic 
privileges and immunities.120  In contrast to sovereign immunity, the 
evolution of intergovernmental immunity in the twentieth century did not 
lead to the adoption of restrictive immunity based on the distinction 
between governmental and private acts.  Instead, the basis for 
intergovernmental immunity is functional necessity, or the idea “that 
 
 117.  See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.  
 118.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2010). 
 119.  The IBRD Articles of Agreement is generally indicative: 
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has 
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or 
has issued or guaranteed securities.  The property and assets of the Bank shall, 
wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of 
seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final judgment against 
the Bank.   
IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. VII(3).  The parallel provisions of the 
agreements of IDA, IFC, and most of the regional multilateral development banks include 
substantively identical language.  See International Development Association Articles of 
Agreement, Jan. 24, 1960, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, art. VII(3); International Finance Corporation 
Articles of Agreement, May 25, 1955, 264 U.N.T.S. 118, art. VI(3); AfDB Agreement, art. 
52; EBRD Agreement, arts. 44 and 46; IDB Charter, art. XI(3). 
 In contrast, the IMF Articles of Agreement expressly provides for absolute 
immunity without qualification, except upon an express waiver by the IMF itself.  See IMF 
Articles of Agreement, art. IX(3) (explaining how the IMF has full immunity from legal 
proceedings unless waived). 
 120.  See Charles H. Brower, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the 
Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 9-11 (2000) (explaining the development of 
immunities for international organizations during the 1800s and early 1900s). 
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international organizations are entitled to such immunities as will enable 
them to exercise their functions in the fulfillment of their purposes.”121  
This doctrine, initially established in the United Nations Charter, is 
considered a customary rule of international law, applicable to both 
member states and non-member states.122  It is generally reflected in IFIs’ 
constitutive agreements, which do not include commercial activity 
exceptions.123 
The International Organization Immunity Act of 1945 (IOIA) is the 
principal statutory basis for intergovernmental immunity under U.S. law.124  
The text of the IOIA appears to support an expansive view of 
intergovernmental immunity that more closely resembles absolute 
sovereign immunity than the FSIA’s restrictive approach to sovereign 
immunity.125  Broad interpretations of the functional necessity doctrine, in 
conjunction with the narrow interpretations of the exceptions set forth in 
their constitutive agreements, have led to calls from critics of international 
organizations to restrict intergovernmental immunity.126 
 
 121.  Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human 
Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 53, 56 (1995). 
 122.  Brower, supra note 120, at 19-20.  Article 105 of the Charter provides that:  “[t]he 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”  U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 
1. 
 123.  See Steven Herz, Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunity, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 155-57 (Daniel D. 
Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (discussing the doctrine of functional necessity and 
its application by domestic courts). 
 124.  See 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f (2010) (defining international organizations and their 
privileges and immunities under U.S. law).  In order for an international organization to be 
granted the privileges and immunities set forth in the IOIA, two requirements generally 
must be met:  (i) the United States must be a member of such organization; and (ii) the 
President must issue an Executive Order designating the international organization as one 
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the IOIA.  See id. at § 288 (defining international 
organizations and explaining how they are designated).  See also Singer, supra note 121, at 
66 n.43 (discussing the IOIA). 
 125.  The IOIA provides, in relevant part, that international organizations “shall enjoy 
the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their 
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.”  22 U.S.C. § 
288a(b) (2010).  See Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (both finding that IFIs were entitled 
to broad-based claims to immunity in respect of tort actions brought by former employees). 
 126.  See Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the 
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 492-513 (2008) 
(critiquing broad interpretations of intergovernmental immunity by U.S. federal courts).  
These critiques do not directly address regulatory immunity or global financial regulation, 
and this Article does not take a position on their substantive content. 
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3. Applications of International Privileges and Immunities to Global 
Finance 
The situations in which international privileges and immunities are 
asserted by state-owned financial entities reflect the diverse ways in which 
they participate in the financial markets.  Sovereign bond offerings have 
generally been treated as “commercial activity” under the FSIA, and are 
therefore not immune to suits brought by bondholders under federal 
securities law.127  The same analysis would presumably apply to loans and 
equity support to private entities by central banks, equity investments by 
foreign government agencies, and SWFs.128  In such cases, the threshold 
consideration is which sovereign act is the basis of the civil action against 
the state.  For example, the imposition of exchange controls may be 
considered a governmental act, whereas the actual issuance of securities 
into global capital markets may be considered a commercial activity.129  In 
either case, courts rely on their assessment of the private/commercial nature 
of the transaction or activity at issue, rather than the governmental purpose 
of such transaction or activity.130 
In the case of IFIs, the application of intergovernmental immunity to 
their financial activities is muddled by differing interpretations regarding 
the scope of the functional necessity doctrine.  In its most favorable and 
literal interpretation, any act relating to a core function may be entitled to 
immunity if it is deemed to be necessary for the functioning of the 
institution.  Therefore, quite plausibly, loans to sovereign and non-
sovereign borrowers, as well as to the capital reserves of IFIs themselves, 
would be immune from jurisdiction and attachment by a domestic court.  
Likewise, the borrowing and hedging activities of IFIs in international 
capital markets through issuing bonds and entering into derivatives 
transactions may be immune from suit given their importance to IFIs—
notwithstanding the fact that, as commercial activities, such transactions 
would fall outside the protections of a restrictive theory of immunity.  The 
constitutive agreements of IFIs appear to embrace this view, as reflected in 
the IBRD Articles of Agreement, which provides:  “To the extent necessary 
to carry out the operations provided for in this Agreement and subject to 
 
 127.  See HLR Note, supra note 83, at 556 (discussing the Supreme Court’s test for 
whether an activity is entitled to immunity). 
 128.  See id. at 565-66 (discussing how central bank support for private entities is treated 
as commercial activity). 
 129.  See Greene & Adee, supra note 95, at 18-19 (examining sovereign immunity and 
its interaction with commercial activity).  See also text accompanying note 107. 
 130.  See Lee, supra note 86, at 371-74 (concluding that foreign exchange transactions 
would be treated as a commercial act, even if private sector banks do not engage in the sale 
of foreign exchange in a given market). 
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the provisions of this Agreement, all property and assets of the Bank shall 
be free from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria of any 
nature.”131 
Countervailing examples and counterarguments qualify this expansive 
view, however.  For certain kinds of transactions, IFIs expressly agree to a 
carve-out of their intergovernmental immunity for particular types of 
financial activities in their constitutive agreements.132  In many other 
instances, IFIs will agree ex ante to arbitration in contracts with 
counterparties.133  More broadly, critics of IFIs point out that the functional 
necessity doctrine can only be satisfied if IFIs may be sued in accordance 
with the expectations of counterparties in the specific market in which they 
are transacting.  According to these critics, absent an express waiver by an 
IFI, its intergovernmental immunity should be denied because such 
intergovernmental immunity places an undue burden on the ability of the 
IFI to exercise its functions in the market.134  This view  envisions a sliding 
scale of intergovernmental immunity in respect of IFIs’ financial activities 
that would ratchet up or down based on the reasonable commercial 
expectations of their counterparties. 
As is evident in the foregoing analysis, although international 
privileges and immunities may provide protection from legislative, judicial, 
or regulatory jurisdiction under international law, these doctrines 
predominantly arise in the context of litigation by private parties against 
 
 131.  IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. VII(6). 
 132.  See, e.g., id., art. VII(3) (providing that “[a]ctions may be brought against the Bank 
only in a court . . . in which the Bank . . . has issued or guaranteed securities”).  See also 
Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, International Financial Institutions and Claims of Private 
Parties: Immunity Obliges, in THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE 93, 122-24 (Hassane Cissé, 
Daniel D. Bradlow & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2012) (examining the circumstances in 
which intergovernmental immunity might not be applicable). 
For example, the ADB Agreement expressly carves out from the ADB’s 
intergovernmental immunity any activities relating to the operation of the institution (i.e., 
any financial activities not directly related to its development mandate), providing that: 
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in 
cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow 
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of 
securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank has its 
principal or a branch office, or has appointed an agent for the purpose of 
accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. 
ADB Agreement, supra note 88, at art. 50 (emphasis added). 
 133.  See Brower, supra note 120, at 78-79 (characterizing submission to international 
arbitration as the overwhelming practice of international organizations). 
 134.  See Singer, supra note 121, at 136-37. 
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foreign states.135  Due to the historical context in which these doctrines 
have evolved, their application to legal obligations imposed by foreign 
states through regulation is relatively untested.136  Domestic regulators, 
which are not strictly obligated to follow jurisprudence interpreting the 
scope and application of international privileges and immunities, have dealt 
with regulatory immunity on a case-by-case basis.  These instances of ad 
hoc administrative rulemaking provide a unique opportunity to evaluate 
existing rules and practices. 
C. Case Study: International Financial Institutions and the Regulation of 
Swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act 
The regulatory reforms enacted in the wake of the global financial 
crisis lead to newfound questions about the special legal status of state-
owned financial entities.  In particular, the implementation of the 
regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act 
has become the focus of unprecedented attention.  The relative openness of 
the administrative rulemaking process in the United States, coupled with 
the absence of any statutory guidance in the text of the Dodd-Frank Act 
itself, spurred the direct engagement of various state-owned financial 
entities throughout the world with U.S. financial regulators.  The following 
analysis highlights the ongoing regulatory dialogue conducted by IFIs, 
individually and collectively.137  The concerns raised by IFIs are shared by 
foreign central banks and other state-owned financial entities with similar 
operational and legal characteristics.138  All of these institutions have cited 
 
 135.  See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 118. 
 136.  See Gaukrodger, supra note 112, at 51 (concluding that it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions about foreign state immunity from host state regulation due to the lack 
of specific treaty-based or statutory authority and the scarcity of state practice). 
 137.  The foregoing discussion focuses on the outreach by multilateral development 
banks of which the United States is a member, which included, inter alia, members of the 
World Bank Group (i.e., IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA), the AfDB, the ADB, the EBRD, and 
the IDB.  
 138.  See, e.g., Letter from Günter Pleines, Bank for Int’l Settlements, to David A. 
Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=48005&SearchText= 
(commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based 
Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping” (File Number S7-16-11) and arguing that the definition of 
“swap” and “security-based swap” should exclude deals with international public 
organizations).  The European Central Bank (“ECB”) claimed that the ECB and other 
foreign central banks would shift swaps activities away from U.S. markets or U.S. 
counterparties if not granted an exemption.  See Letter from Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, Eur. 
Cent. Bank, to Jacqueline Mesa, Director, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 7 (Oct. 11, 
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their international public missions, and the attendant legal protections 
thereunder, as a primary basis for excluding them from the jurisdiction of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  The analysis that follows reveals the extent to which 
assertions of international privileges and immunities may enable 
differential regulatory treatment.  The malleability of these international 
law doctrines has provided substantial discretion to financial regulators to 
define the scope and conditions of state-owned financial entities’ 
obligations. 
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the OTC derivatives 
market—most notably, the market for swaps transactions—was 
predominantly subject only to indirect regulatory oversight.139  The Dodd-
Frank Act transforms the regulation of swaps in a variety of ways.  Title 
VII of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new legal framework for the OTC 
derivatives market, including:  (i) mandatory clearing of swaps transactions 
through central clearing parties and mandatory trading through either 
regulated exchanges or swap execution facilities; (ii) requiring the posting 
of collateral (“margin”) for certain swaps transactions; (iii) requiring new 
categories of market participants—swap dealers and major swap 
participants—to register with the CFTC and/or SEC; and (iv) imposing new 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements on parties in swaps 
transactions.140 
The derivatives activities of state-owned financial entities are not 
expressly referenced at all in the Dodd-Frank Act.  Notably, the Dodd-
Frank Act exempts the Federal Reserve from all regulation under Title VII 
while remaining silent about the treatment of foreign central banks and 
other state-owned financial entities with similar functions.141  In response to 
 
2011), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/View 
Comment.aspx?id=49816&SearchText= (commenting on Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and expressing concern that the ECB may fall under the definition of a major swap 
participant and thus become subject to regulation).  See also Matt Cameron and Peter 
Madigan, ECB Threatens to Stop Trading Swaps with US Banks, RISK MAG., Nov. 2011, at 
10 (noting the possibility that the ECB might end trading derivatives with U.S. markets if 
they are not given exemptions from Dodd-Frank Act regulations). 
 139.  See Chander & Costa, supra note 74, at 658-61.  An example of indirect regulation 
was the public disclosure of certain bilateral swaps contracts pursuant to mandatory 
reporting requirements under the Exchange Act; however, swaps trades were not subject to 
registration, risk provisioning, or capital requirements in the United States. 
 140.  See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 711-754; see also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial 
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 
299-303 (2011) (providing an overview of the objectives and proposed methods of 
regulating OTC derivatives markets under the Dodd-Frank Act).  Other major aspects of 
Title VII include bolstering the authority of federal regulators to prosecute market abuses 
and requiring banks to “push-out” many swap activities to affiliates. 
 141.  The Dodd-Frank Act excludes from the definition of swap “any agreement, 
contract, or transaction a counterparty of which is a Federal Reserve bank, the Federal 
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the resulting uncertainty, IFIs have engaged directly with the CFTC and 
SEC, the two federal agencies entrusted with the responsibility of enacting 
the rules that would clarify the scope of Title VII’s mandate and provide 
operational details on its implementation.142 
IFIs have expressed concerns about the implications of the Dodd-
Frank Act on their derivatives activities in several respects: 
First, IFIs have sought assurances that federal regulators will not 
categorize them as swap dealers or major swap participants, which would 
require IFIs to register with the CFTC and/or SEC and subject them to 
mandatory clearing and enhanced reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, among other obligations.143 
Second, IFIs have flagged the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing rules, which 
require that a swap transaction as a general rule be cleared through a 
clearinghouse.144  An exemption to clearing is available to any swap 
counterparty that is a non-financial end-user (i.e., not a swap dealer or a 
major swap participant) and uses swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial 
risk.145  Therefore, under a plain language interpretation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, an end-user that does not meet these requirements—such as a financial 
entity (as defined by the Dodd-Frank Act)—would be required to clear its 
swaps. 
Third, IFIs have objected to being subject to margin requirements—
i.e., being required by law to post collateral with swaps counterparties.146  
 
Government, or a Federal agency that is expressly backed by the full faith and credit of the 
United States.”  Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (47)(B)(ix). 
 142.  See Deborah Solomon, U.S. Regulators Aim to Extend Reach, WALL ST. J., May 
26, 2011 (explaining how U.S. regulators may impose restrictions on foreign governments 
engaging in financial transactions in the United States). 
 143.  See Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy, Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. et al., 
to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 2-3 (Sept. 14, 2012), 
available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments 
/ViewComment.aspx?id=58958&SearchText= [hereinafter World Bank September 2012 
Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Margin Requirements for 
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants” and both acknowledging 
and welcoming the CFTC’s decision not to require multilateral development banks to 
register as swap dealers or major swap participants). 
 144.  See id. at 3 (acknowledging and welcoming the CFTC’s decision not to subject 
multilateral development banks to swap clearing requirements). 
 145.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 723 (setting forth an exception to mandatory clearing for 
any swap in which one of the counterparties:  “(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using swaps 
to hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) notifies the Commission, in a manner set 
forth by the Commission, how it generally meets its financial obligations associated with 
entering into noncleared swaps”). 
 146.  A party entering into a swap faces rate or market risk (e.g., interest rate risk and 
currency risk) and counterparty credit risk.  When rates move against a party, the party is 
said to be “out of the money.”  Conversely, when rates move in favor of a party, that party is 
said to be “in the money.”  Requiring a party that is out of the money to post collateral 
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Traditionally, IFIs, like their sovereign counterparts, have only agreed to 
receive collateral from swaps counterparties, not post collateral against 
swaps exposures.147 
Finally, aside from the above-described concerns, IFIs have raised the 
possibility of residual and indirect regulation, even if IFIs are exempted 
from specific requirements.148 
In their engagement with financial regulators, IFIs have employed a 
dual-pronged approach premised on their legally-defined missions and 
immunities under federal law and international treaties with the United 
States.  First, IFIs have steadfastly cited the intergovernmental immunity 
set forth in their respective constitutive agreements, taking particular note 
of the prior practice of the United States to grant generally unqualified 
deference.149  While not explicitly referencing the functional necessity 
 
reduces market risk to the other party.  SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 966, 969. 
 147.  See Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy, Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. et al., 
to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Nov. 26, 2012), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/November/20121130/R-1415/R-
1415_112612_110877_688136176592_1.pdf [hereinafter World Bank November 2012 
Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities” and seeking exemption from margin requirements 
on uncleared swaps entered into by multilateral development banks); see also David 
Rothnie, Difficult Journey, INT’L FIN. REV., Apr. 2012, at 10-12 (noting the historical 
reluctance of sovereigns and IFIs to posting collateral relating to swaps). 
 148.  The World Bank, writing on behalf of itself and other multilateral development 
banks, argued that only “a comprehensive solution” would preclude the possibility of 
various forms of residual and indirect regulation, and proposed that the term “swap” be 
defined to exclude transactions with such institutions, thereby completely exempting them 
from the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements.  See Letter from Vincenzo La Via, Int’l Bank for 
Reconstruction and Dev. et al., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n 6-8, attachment 2 (July 22, 2011), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=47911&SearchText= 
[hereinafter World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule 
entitled “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap 
Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping” (File Number 
S7-16-11)). 
 149.  See id. at 2-5 (referring to “well-settled United States legislation” and the EU’s 
“consistent record of regulatory forbearance”); World Bank November 2012 Comment 
Letter, supra note 147, at 4-5 (referring to a legal opinion requested by, and provided to, the 
Chairman of the CFTC that concluded regulation of IBRD and IFC would constitute a 
breach by the United States of its international obligations and that the Dodd-Frank Act does 
not authorize any curtailment of those institutions’ intergovernmental immunity); Letter 
from Soren Elbech, Treasurer, Inter-American Dev. Bank, and J. James Spinner, General 
Counsel, Inter-American Dev. Bank, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n (July 22, 2011), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=47925&SearchText=; 
Letter from Isabelle Laurent, Deputy Treasurer and Head of Funding, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Dev., to Jacqueline Hamra Mesa, Dir., Office of Internal Affairs, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (July 22, 2011), available at 
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doctrine, IFIs have pointedly emphasized the importance of their 
derivatives activities to the fulfillment of their institutional mandates.150  
Second, IFIs have emphasized their political uniqueness, as reflected in 
their legally-defined international public missions and collective 
governance structures.151 
The arguments advanced by IFIs have a broader application to the 
concerns regarding extraterritorial regulation shared with other state-owned 
financial entities.  The difficulty of relying on territoriality as a threshold 
principle is underscored by the fact that several IFIs and numerous other 
international organizations are headquartered in the United States.152  The 
World Bank, on behalf of itself and other international organizations, has 
consistently taken the position that it is not a U.S. person due to its legal 
character as an international organization and the offshore nature of its 
development activities.153  Further, IFIs have justified their use of swaps 
based on their intended purpose to hedge currency, interest rate, and other 
market risks arising from their lending, borrowing, equity management, 
and investment operations.154  Accordingly, IFIs argue that the regulation of 
their relatively low-risk hedging activities should be considered to be 
outside the scope of the Dodd-Frank Act and therefore left unregulated.155 
The CFTC, as the primary regulator of IFIs’ swaps activities, has 
largely embraced the positions advanced by IFIs in applicable rulemaking 
 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewExParte.aspx?id=314&SearchText=. 
 150.  See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, at 8 (stating that 
“[t]he use of derivatives for risk management purposes is integral to the development 
operations of the IBRD, IFC, and other MDBs”). 
 151.  See id. at 6 (describing the management of IBRD and IFC by their respective 
sovereign shareholders, including the United States, and the direct oversight authority of 
their respective boards and audit committees over financial operations); World Bank 
September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 143, at 6-7 (describing how margin 
requirements would impair the development effectiveness of multilateral development 
banks). 
 152.  Among such entities are the World Bank, the IMF, the IDB, and the United 
Nations. 
 153.  See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, at 4.  See also Letter 
from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President, Public Policy and Advocacy, Sec. 
Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n (Aug. 27, 2012), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58652&SearchText= 
(recommending that the CFTC exclude supranational organizations from the definition of 
U.S. person in order to “promote international comity and harmonization of international 
swap regulation”) [hereinafter SIFMA Comment Letter]. 
 154.  See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, attachment 1 
(describing how multilateral development banks use swaps). 
 155.  See World Bank September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 143, at 5-6 
(claiming that the imposition of margin requirements would be inconsistent with the 
CFTC’s statutory mandate and would serve no policy purpose). 
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to date.  In exempting IFIs from registration as swap dealers or major swap 
participants, the CFTC determined: 
[T]he sovereign or international status of foreign governments, 
foreign central banks and international financial institutions that 
themselves participate in the swap markets in a commercial 
manner is relevant in determining whether such entities are 
subject to registration and regulation as a major swap participant 
or swap dealer.  Canons of statutory construction “assume that 
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of 
other nations when they write American laws.”  There is nothing 
in the text or history of the swap-related provisions of Title VII to 
establish that Congress intended to deviate from the traditions of 
the international system by including foreign governments, 
foreign central banks and international financial institutions 
within the definitions of the terms “swap dealer” or “major swap 
participant,” thereby requiring that they affirmatively register as 
swap dealers or major swap participants with the CFTC and be 
regulated as such.  The CFTC does not believe that foreign 
governments, foreign central banks and international financial 
institutions should be required to register as swap dealers or 
major swap participants.156 
Relying on similar reasoning and expressly citing international comity 
and the “traditions of the international system”, the CFTC has also 
exempted foreign governments, foreign central banks, and IFIs from the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing requirements.157  However, the CFTC refrained 
from applying a blanket regulatory exemption to IFIs’ swaps activities, 
choosing not to accept the World Bank’s initial proposal.158  Rules 
addressing the treatment of IFIs in respect of any applicable margin 
requirements for uncleared swaps remain pending.159 
 
 156.  Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap 
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 
77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,693 (May 23, 2012) (internal citations omitted). 
 157.  End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,560, 
42,562 (July 19, 2012).   
 158.  A complete carve-out for foreign and multinational public entities on the basis of 
international privileges and immunities appeared to be viewed as a viable option by at least 
one CFTC Commissioner during the rulemaking process.  See Further Definition of “Swap,” 
“Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-
Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Statement of CFTC Commissioner Jill Sommers 
re: Transactions Involving Certain Foreign or Multinational Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,818, 
29,899-900 (proposed May 23, 2011) (advocating for the preservation of international 
privileges and immunities for multinational public organizations in order to avoid hindering 
their operational effectiveness).  
 159.  See Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011); Margin and Capital 
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III. GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AS COMITY 
Claims of freedom from the regulatory authority of a government 
highlight the potential for conflict arising from the juxtaposition of two 
complementary legal concepts:  national sovereignty and international 
privileges and immunities.  The special treatment of state-owned financial 
entities due to their sovereign status casts in high relief the unique friction 
points in the governance of the global economy, in which there is no 
unified meta-sovereign rulemaking and enforcement authority.  This is 
certainly evident in derivatives regulation.  The implementation of 
mandatory rules governing swaps transactions constitutes an abrupt 
transformation in a heretofore largely unregulated area.  As apparent in the 
CFTC’s rulemaking concerning foreign central banks and IFIs, the 
application of international privileges and immunities is marked by an 
ambiguously-defined compromise between market equality and sovereign 
prerogative. 
A. The Systemic Legitimacy of State-Owned Financial Entities 
International privileges and immunities, as applied by domestic 
financial regulators, are justified on the very terms on which they were 
created:  to respect international comity by preserving the authority of each 
state to govern within its own borders and in respect of its own subjects.160  
Similarly, the intergovernmental immunity afforded to international 
organizations reflects the exclusive nature and purpose of their activities, 
which may be viewed as express and implicit delegations of sovereign 
authority by their respective member states.161  A key distinction between 
international organizations and their state counterparts is the doctrine of 
functional necessity, reflected in the absence of a commercial activity 
exception to intergovernmental immunity.162  In comparison to sovereign 
 
Requirements for Covered Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,564 (proposed May 11, 2011).  See also 
Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,394, 44,394 (July 23, 2013) (noting the 
re-opening of the comment period on proposed rules regarding margin and capital 
requirements for covered swap entities); 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,794 n.63 (noting that the 
CFTC has not yet finalized these rules). 
 160.  See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity 
Through National Decisions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1185, 1187 (2011) (noting and 
critiquing references to comity in Supreme Court decisions addressing sovereign immunity). 
 161.  See Singer, supra note 121, at 127; see also Martha, supra note 132, at 97 
(characterizing IFIs as “providers of international public goods” that its member states have 
determined cannot be provided by themselves). 
 162.  Domestic regulators that are not accustomed to parsing the doctrinal subtleties of 
international privileges and immunities may blur this distinction.  In determining that IFIs 
were not required to register as swap dealers or major swap participants, it appears that the 
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immunity, the more absolute approach of intergovernmental immunity may 
be justified by the fact that IFIs, notwithstanding their considerable capital 
assets and broad economic mandates, lack the territorial sovereignty 
enjoyed by states and have more limited means of enforcing international 
legal commitments through extrajudicial means.163 
These legal entitlements have prescriptive and normative implications 
for global financial regulation.  First, governance gaps may arise if 
conflicts between extraterritorial regulation and international privileges and 
immunities are resolved differently across jurisdictions.  On the one hand, 
it may be argued that the regulatory diversity resulting from differential 
treatment of such institutions may be desirable insofar as it implicitly 
enables cost-benefit analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
regulatory priorities.164  On the other hand, however, such gaps may be 
suboptimal in other respects.  One possibility is that regulatory diversity 
may lead to uncertainty among private market participants and other 
regulators about the future treatment of state-owned financial entities.165 
Second, even if there is regulatory consistency across jurisdictions, the 
discretionary regulation of state-owned financial entities may perpetuate 
doubts about the legitimacy of global financial regulation.166  The challenge 
of legitimacy applies generally to any global governance regime in which 
there is a tension between the accountability of domestic regulators to their 
own citizenry and their accountability to foreign regulatory counterparts.167  
The issue of systemic legitimacy is most apparent in respect of the dual-
faced roles of foreign central banks and IFIs, which operate as market 
 
CFTC implied that the intergovernmental immunity granted to IFIs is qualified by the 
commercial activity exception based on the restrictive approach to immunity.  See 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 30,693.  The World Bank subsequently requested clarification and a correction on 
this point.  See World Bank September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 142, attachment 3. 
 163.  See Brower, supra note 120, at 16-17 (analyzing the motivations for and 
complications arising from the application of sovereign immunity concepts to international 
organizations). 
 164.  See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 258 (2011) 
(observing that fragmented global governance may reflect forum-shifting/forum-shopping 
by empowered states to serve their own interests); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding 
International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1049, 1103–06 (2012) (outlining a “competition/politics” response to fragmentation). 
 165.  See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 55, 68 (2011) (noting the considerable uncertainty states face in respect of 
each other’s regulatory systems). 
 166.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 330-32 (describing the particularly problematic 
legitimacy of global financial regulation in comparison to purely domestic regulation). 
 167.  See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 267-
68 (Summer/Autumn 2005) (noting the effect of state recognition of external policies on the 
domestic policies of those states). 
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participants and also function as regulatory supervisors and advisers in the 
international financial architecture.  The granting of regulatory immunity to 
such state-owned financial entities may therefore raise unique legitimacy 
questions.  The effectiveness of central banks and IFIs in projecting state 
regulatory power is premised on perceptions of their legitimacy.168  
Legitimacy criteria fall under two broad categories: input legitimacy and 
output legitimacy.  Input legitimacy focuses on the means of lawmaking 
and considers whether the lawmaking process is representative and 
procedurally fair.169  Output legitimacy focuses on the content of laws and 
considers whether the laws themselves meet a normative standard based on 
what is deemed to be right, acceptable, desired, or just.170  The malleability 
of international privileges and immunities in respect of extraterritorial 
regulation offers the advantages of ad hoc lawmaking to a unique class of 
market participants.  From an output legitimacy perspective, however, the 
possibility of being granted regulatory immunity may incentivize 
inefficient, rent-seeking behavior by state-owned financial entities based on 
selective assertions of international privileges and immunities and the 
structuring of their market activities to permit maximum use of such 
privileges and immunities.171  From an input legitimacy perspective, the 
domestically-driven administrative law process of determining the scope of 
regulatory immunity may lack sufficient constructive visibility 
commensurate with the global scope of the resulting substantive rules.172  
 
 168.  See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
705, 706 (1988) (defining legitimacy as the “quality of a rule which derives from a 
perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in 
accordance with right process”) (italics removed).  See also Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire 
R. Kelly, Linking NGO Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1011, 1014-15 (2011) (describing legitimacy as “socially constructed”). 
 169.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 323 (noting the importance of democratic 
processes to input legitimacy); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative 
Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 608, 614-19 (2008) (describing the importance of 
representation and other features in establishing input legitimacy). 
 170.  See Kelly, supra note 169, at 608, 619-22 (describing the features that create 
results-based output legitimacy). 
 171.  See José E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as 
Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591, 598 (2008) (observing that the conduct 
of international organizations has normative consequences independent from the authority 
delegated to them by states). 
 172.  See Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational Standard-
Setting, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 480, 501 (2011) (noting the importance of broad-based 
visibility of regulatory consultation processes to the perceived legitimacy of their ends); 
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Lessons for Informal International 
Lawmaking, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 437, 438-39 (Joost Pauwelyn et al. 
eds., 2012) (noting the limitations of domestic implementation as a means of addressing 
external accountability to other countries and their banks, firms, and consumers). 
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Even if domestic administrative lawmaking concerning international 
privileges and immunities is carried out in accordance with public 
participatory principles, such as the “notice-and-comment” procedures 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the legitimizing 
process may be too attenuated from the stakeholders that may be affected 
by it.173  Further, the legitimacy of central banks and IFIs may be adversely 
impacted by disagreement or inconsistency among private market 
participants about the scope of the special treatment granted to them.174  
The doctrinal indeterminacy of regulatory immunity—reflected in good-
faith differences of opinion among subjects of extraterritorial regulation—
may undermine the compliance “pull” of the broader set of rules that 
compose global financial regulation.175  The broad-based regulatory and 
supervisory powers of states and international organizations may be 
consequently compromised by doubts about their ability to engage with 
stakeholders as an “honest broker”.176 
B. Principles of Global Financial Comity 
International privileges and immunities are at once too blunt and too 
inchoate to address considerations of comity, national sovereignty, and 
systemic legitimacy in global financial regulation.  In their current form, 
the blanket application of these doctrines is not conducive to a holistic, 
 
 173.  See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 331 (noting the legitimating function of domestic 
political participation in the lawmaking process). 
 174.  For example, in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulation of derivatives, this 
is arguably evident in comments from SIFMA and ISDA, two prominent industry 
associations, concerning the application of margin requirements to foreign central banks and 
IFIs.  Compare Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, et al., to 
David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 6-7 (Sept. 14, 2012), 
available at http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDc5Nw==/ISDA-SIFMA-
CFTCMarginCommentLetter091412.pdf (commenting on CFTC RIN 3038-AC97 - Margin 
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants and 
qualifiedly supporting the exemption of sovereigns, central banks, and IFIs from margin 
requirements for non-cleared swaps), with Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and 
Derivatives Ass’n, to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al. 10-11 (Nov. 26, 
2012), available at 
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTEwMA==/Margin%20for%20Uncleared%20Letter.pdf 
(commenting on the proposed rulemaking regarding Margin and Capital Requirements for 
Covered Swap Entities, and stating “that all sovereigns and central banks should post 
margin in order to achieve international comity”). 
 175.  See Franck, supra note 168, at 713-25 (discussing how different factors of 
determinacy affect the legitimacy of rules). 
 176.  See Kelly, supra note 169, at 625-26 (observing that the effectiveness of 
international organizations depends in part on their perceived responsiveness to the demands 
of civil society and the interests that they represent). 
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transparent assessment of the diverse situations in which state-owned 
financial entities participate in global financial markets.  Given a regulatory 
environment in which private market participants are subject to 
increasingly far-reaching regulatory oversight, it stands to reason that there 
may be countervailing factors warranting the extension of these 
requirements to their public counterparts.  Further thereto, it has been 
suggested that certain government instrumentalities and international 
organizations should be regulated as international legal persons, with the 
attendant rights and obligations of multinational corporations and other 
private actors.177 
This goes too far.  Notwithstanding the legitimacy concerns 
implicated by their application, international privileges and immunities 
do—and, moreover, should—remain salient.  In the context of the global 
financial system, these privileges and immunities formalize the unique 
public missions and public governance of the state-owned financial entities 
that enjoy them.  More than simply permitting such public entities to 
participate in the financial markets, these doctrines provide the 
predictability and stability necessary to incentivize and empower them to 
act in the best interests of their shareholders (i.e., states and their citizens) 
in their dual capacities as regulators and market participants.  The 
shortcomings of international privileges and immunities are a symptom of 
the conceptual limitations of international law to address the complexities 
caused by the convergence of public and private law, rather than a cause.178 
Comity as a means of allocating regulatory authority is hampered by 
the increasingly diffuse, decentralized structure of the international 
financial architecture.179  Thus, the fundamental question is how to 
operationalize the principles of comity on which international privileges 
and immunities are based.  A framework for global financial comity is one 
response.  Its normative principles address two interrelated concerns 
implicated by the presence of state-owned financial entities in the market:  
first, by calibrating the role of the state in fragmented, multilayered global 
governance regimes and second, by contextualizing the distinction between 
public and private legal responsibility.  First, global financial comity takes 
into account the interdependence of the state’s responsibilities as a 
regulator and its rights as a market participant.  By calibrating their own 
 
 177.  See Alvarez, supra note 171, at 610 (noting the work of the U.N. International Law 
Commission to delineate the responsibility of international organizations with legal 
liability). 
 178.  See Backer, supra note 97, at 499-500. 
 179.  See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 56-57 (2001) (observing that the effectiveness of comity may be dependent on 
the size of the group). 
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authority to regulate extraterritorially on the willingness to apply the same 
process of lawmaking (but not necessarily the same rules or substantive 
outcomes) to their own state-owned financial entities, states and their 
intergovernmental agents enhance the legitimacy of their actions.180  This 
process of norm internalization requires states to recognize the benefits of 
engaging with multiple regulators across regulatory regimes.181  Second, 
global financial comity permits a more nuanced, context-specific 
conception of public and private domains in international law.  A pluralistic 
approach to regulation more accurately reflects the dynamic, fluid 
relationships of global finance.182  Instead of invoking the principle of 
comity without substantive context, extraterritorial regulation and 
exceptions thereto (whether based on international privileges and 
immunities or on any other grounds in respect of any party, public or 
private) would rely on normative persuasion, cost-benefit analysis, or other 
metrics deemed appropriate.183  Embracing the inherently political nature of 
global financial regulation would be another consequence.  By 
“foregrounding” the political dynamics that underlie assertions of 
extraterritorial regulatory authority and international privileges and 
immunities, regulators and market participants may be able to engage in a 
more transparent dialogue regarding their intentions and constraints.184 
There are a variety of institutional mechanisms through which global 
financial comity could be carried out.  The Dodd-Frank Act includes 
numerous mandates requiring administrative agencies to consult and 
 
 180.  See Parrish, supra note 33, at 870 (arguing that international norms and procedures 
in lieu of extraterritoriality enhance, rather than detract from, state power by legitimizing a 
state’s meta-objectives). 
 181.  See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to Intersystemic Governance in 
Securities Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233, 240-44 (2007) (describing the importance of 
coordination and regulatory persuasion, instead of hierarchical regulatory control).  See also 
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 573-77 (describing the potential role of states and 
international organizations as facilitative orchestrators). 
 182.  See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 523 (2005) (characterizing the distinction between state 
policy and private agreement as “always problematic . . . [and] increasingly irrelevant”). 
 183.  See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 301, 318-20 (2007) (noting the importance of the mutual benefits underlying 
comity); Ming-Sung Kuo, Inter-Public Legality or Post-Public Legitimacy? Global 
Governance and the Curious Case of Global Administrative Law as a New Paradigm of 
Law, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1050, 1073-74 (2012) (noting the primacy of public dialogue on 
the legitimacy of law within extralegal politics). 
 184.  See David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD? 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 57-60 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (noting the dangers of disregarding the distributive 
effects of politics on global governance lawmaking). 
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coordinate with their foreign regulatory counterparts.185  Instead of solely 
viewing these mechanisms as a means of coordinating and enforcing 
regulatory action, regulators may be able to use them to facilitate 
constructive dialogue with market participants on a global scale.186  
Administrative law procedures in different jurisdictions could be expanded 
to promote dialogue among a broader group of stakeholders, including 
domestic regulators, international organizations, and various non-state 
actors.187  Specifically with respect to the assertion of international 
privileges and immunities, these coordinating mechanisms would provide a 
forum for state-owned financial entities to express their interests, recognize 
conflicting policy objectives, and prescribe shared fundamental values to 
guide regulation.188 
The Financial Stability Board established by the G20 may be one 
appropriate forum for the promulgation of the rules and objectives for such 
institutional dialogue.  Towards that end, an international administrative 
law agency with enforcement powers could serve as an institutional forum 
for the identification of interests and resolution of disputes.189  Granted, it is 
unlikely that state-owned financial entities would be willing to voluntarily 
cede autonomy over their operational practices to an autonomous 
international body.190  Alternatively, domestic administrative lawmaking 
processes could institutionalize and formalize existing modes of input.  
These modes of input would grant deference to foreign rulemaking as 
 
 185.  For example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC, the SEC, and prudential 
regulators to “consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the 
establishment of consistent international standards with respect to the regulation (including 
fees) of swaps . . . and may agree to such information-sharing arrangements as may be 
deemed to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors 
[and] swap counterparties.”  Dodd-Frank Act § 752(a). 
 186.  The effectiveness of social acculturation is premised on the interactions among 
regulators and market participants leading to greater cooperation, coordination, and 
compliance.  See Verdier, supra note 71, 164-65, 171 (noting the need for more detailed 
empirical analysis in the context of transgovernmental regulatory networks). 
 187.  See Reiser & Kelly, supra note 168, at 1016-17; see also Benedict Kingsbury, Nico 
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 33 (Summer/Autumn 2005) (approvingly noting the use of notice-
and-comment procedures in the United States that take into account international 
negotiations among regulators). 
 188.  See Weber, supra note 66, at 692-94 (arguing for the development and 
identification of common core values for establishing a system of multilayered governance). 
 189.  See Pan, supra note 15, at 280 (noting the dispute settlement powers of the 
European System of Financial Supervisors). 
 190.  Notwithstanding, in this respect, the Santiago Principles concerning the disclosure 
and corporate governance practices of SWFs could arguably be distinguished from the 
financial activities of central banks and IFIs insofar as the diversity of SWF practices and 
the relatively new and unsettled nature of SWFs’ equity investments may incentivize SWF 
states to agree to a voluntary code of conduct. 
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referenced by third party private market participants.191  Similarly, legally 
non-binding standards set forth by transgovernmental regulatory networks 
pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures may be used as an additional 
reference point.192 
In all of these instances, state-owned financial entities would retain a 
rebuttable presumption of legality that would be conditioned on identifying 
a reasonable public basis for their market activities and applying any 
available international privileges and immunities to the extent necessary for 
such entities to carry out these expressed public objectives.193  Although 
this procedural framework does not dictate the adoption of particular 
substantive rules, it would suggest a shift away from formalist rulemaking 
towards functionalist approaches to conflicts between extraterritorial 
regulation and national sovereignty.  For example, the adoption of a 
“purpose” based test for determining whether financial activities of a 
sovereign entity constitute “commercial activity” would provide a means 
 
 191.  For example, private market participants have expressly cited the anti-competitive 
impact of divergent treatment by U.S. and EU regulators in respect of derivatives regulation: 
[T]he imposition of margin requirements on foreign sovereigns would have a 
serious anti-competitive impact on U.S. swap entities in relation to their foreign 
competitors.  Assuming non-U.S. jurisdictions create margin rules, foreign 
regulators are unlikely to apply onerous margin requirements to transactions 
with their sovereign.  Recent discussions within Europe indicate a difference 
between the European Union (“E.U.”) approach and the U.S. approach.  For 
example, in a recent letter from the senior officials of the European Central 
Bank (“ECB”) to the CFTC and the SEC, the ECB asks the Commissions to 
exclude from the definition of “swap” and “security-based swap” any 
agreement, contract, or transaction in which one counterparty is a public 
international organization, such as the ECB, or a national central bank of a 
market economy.  If the E.U. excludes such entities from its margin 
requirements while the U.S. margin rules capture such entities, U.S. swap 
entities will be placed at a severe disadvantage in competing for the business of 
sovereign counterparties. 
Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, et al. 12 (July 6, 2011) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/November/20111122/R-1415/R-
1415_070611_81727_628897276954_1.pdf (commenting regarding Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities). 
 192.  In respect of the applicability of derivatives regulation to sovereign and 
supranational entities, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO have 
determined, after requesting comments on a prior draft report, that sovereigns, central banks, 
multilateral development banks, and BIS should not be required to collect or post margin.  
See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, Second Consultative Document, Margin 
Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared Derivatives 7 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs242.pdf. 
 193.  See Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 307-08 (identifying the importance of state consent 
in transnational economic regimes). 
PARK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:06 AM 
2014] GUARDING THE GUARDIANS 785 
 
for explaining, justifying, and contextualizing the financial activity in 
question.194  In respect of derivatives regulation, the CFTC has articulated a 
principle that expressly distinguishes SWFs from other foreign state-owned 
financial entities due to the different nature of their respective commercial 
activities.195  The European Union has followed a substantively similar—
but not identical—approach, independent of the Dodd-Frank Act 
rulemaking process, under derivatives rules promulgated by the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).196 
Another regulatory technique to institutionalize global financial 
comity is through mutual recognition regimes.  Mutual recognition 
circumscribes the application of extraterritorial regulation by allowing 
regulators to recognize another jurisdiction’s standards as an adequate 
substitute, if not functionally equivalent.  Accordingly, foreign firms or 
activities that comply with their home state’s regulation may be exempted 
from compliance with the host state’s regulatory requirements.197  One of 
the primary benefits of mutual recognition is to facilitate recognition of the 
benefits of integration and promote dialogue among disparate market actors 
regarding substantive goals, without requiring substantive harmonization of 
two or more countries’ laws.198  In contrast to extraterritorial regulation of 
global economic activity based on the unilateral projection of domestic law, 
mutual recognition consists of extraterritorial lawmaking premised on the 
intermingling of multiple domestic laws to constitute the global.199  Of 
particular note, U.S. financial regulators are currently exploring a variant of 
mutual recognition through the concept of “substituted compliance.”200  
 
 194.  See HLR Note, supra note 83, at 568-69 (endorsing the use of a “sovereign 
purpose” test); Gaukrodger, supra note 112, at 52-53 (noting the importance of the type of 
foreign state entity for purposes of determining whether it should be entitled to regulatory 
immunity). 
 195.  To cite one example, the CFTC determined that “registration and regulation as a 
swap dealer or major swap participant under such circumstances may be warranted . . . for 
foreign corporate entities and sovereign wealth funds, which act in the market in the same 
manner as private asset managers.”  77 Fed. Reg. at 30,693.  See also Gaukrodger, supra 
note 112, at 53 (identifying “clearly commercial acts” as a basis for precluding regulatory 
immunity). 
 196.  EMIR exempts multilateral development banks and any other entities that are both 
owned by central governments and have explicit central government guarantees from its 
jurisdiction, with the exception of certain reporting obligations.  See Regulation on OTC 
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, Regulation (EU) No 646/2012, 
July 4, 2012, art. I(5)(a), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF. 
 197.  Verdier, supra note 165, at 57. 
 198.  See id. at 65-66; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155, 1124 (2007). 
 199.  See Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 167, at 266-68. 
 200.  See 78 Fed. Reg. at 43,786 (determining that the CFTC’s implementation of 
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Under this regime, a foreign financial entity would be permitted to 
substitute compliance with its home state’s derivatives rules (in lieu of the 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act to which it would otherwise be 
subject) so long as the foreign home state’s regulatory requirements, in the 
view of the appropriate U.S. financial regulator, are deemed to be 
comparable.201  The inclusion of state-owned financial entities in this 
regime, which could take into account the unique public supervisory 
oversight to which their activities are subject, would enhance the systemic 
legitimacy of global financial regulation. 
CONCLUSION: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GLOBAL MARKET 
This Article is intended to be both interstitial and universal in focus.  
By examining the cross-border regulation of state-owned financial entities, 
it seeks to identify and clarify the legal issues applicable to an important 
class of actors in global financial markets.  In the process, this Article seeks 
to highlight the paramount importance of legitimacy to global financial 
regulation and to shed light on how legitimacy claims are subject to the 
means by which regulatory authority is exercised as well as to the legal 
entitlements of market participants. 
The power to regulate extraterritorially is both a reflection and an 
instrument of national sovereignty that defines, augments, and refines state 
power.  The presence of state-owned financial entities in global financial 
markets highlights one of numerous tensions in the relationship between 
transnational economic activity and the nation-state.  The existence of 
international privileges and immunities underscores the importance of 
balancing the objectives of extraterritorial regulation with the prerogatives 
of central banks and IFIs in their dual capacities as regulators and market 
participants.  The framework of global financial comity outlined in this 
Article attempts to harmonize the doctrines of international privileges and 
immunities with the overlapping extraterritorial, decentralized, and 
multilayered financial governance regimes of the twenty-first century.  A 
more refined, pluralistic application of international privileges and 
immunities may facilitate the participation of a broader group of private 
 
substituted compliance requires additional time, at least through the end of 2013); see also 
CFTC, The European Commission and the CFTC reach a Common Path Forward on 
Derivatives, PR6640-13, July 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13. 
 201.  See 77 Fed. Reg. at 41,232-34 (outlining the process for determining substituted 
compliance).  One of the premises on which substituted compliance is being considered is 
the adoption of regulatory requirements by non-U.S. regulators that are similar to certain 
U.S. rules.  In other words, the availability of substituted compliance is premised on partial 
harmonization.  See 78 Fed. Reg. at 878. 
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and public market participants, and continue to encourage central banks, 
IFIs, and similar state-owned financial entities to apply such tenets to their 
own conduct. 
Looking more expansively, the principles and objectives of global 
financial comity are of potential value to financial regulation generally.  
The development, institutionalization, and effectiveness of the current 
administrative agency practices described in this Article—such as 
consultations between U.S. financial regulators and their foreign 
counterparts on parallel rulemaking and the implementation of substituted 
compliance under the Dodd-Frank Act—are areas worthy of future 
empirical study.  This exploration is part of a broader need to examine the 
relevance of long-standing legal doctrines, such as international privileges 
and immunities, amidst structural changes in the international economy.  
The future evolution of global financial regulation requires careful 
consideration of how these doctrines are applied in order to ensure that they 
protect the legal rights of their holders while not unduly hindering the 
development of new governance regimes that may incorporate 
transgovernmental regulatory networks, mutual recognition, self-
regulation, and public-private partnerships, among other possibilities. 
 
